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To Members of the Forty~fifth Colorado General Assembly: 
In accordance with the provisions of House Joint 
Resolution No. 1030, 1964 regular session, the Legislative 
Council submits the accompanying report and recommendations 
relating to a uniform commercial code for Colorado. 
This report and recommendations were approved by 
the Council at its meeting on November 23, 1964, for 
transmission to the members of the Forty-fifth General 
Assembly. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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COLORADO GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL 
ROOM 341, STATE CAPITOL 
DENVER 2, COLORADO 
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November 4, 1964 
Representative C. P. Lamb, Chairman 
Colorado Legislative Council 
Room 341, State Capitol 
Denver, Colorado 
Dear Mr. Chairman: 
MEMBERS 
Lt. Gov. Robert L. Knoua 
Sen. WIiiiam E. Bladaoe 
Sen. Edward J. Byrne 
Sen. Frank l. GIii 
San. Floyd Ollver 
_Speaker Jo'hn D. Vanderhoof 
Rep. JoHph V. CalabreH 
Rep. John l. Kane 
Rap. WIiiiam O. Lennox 
lep. John W. Nlchola 
lep. Clarence H. Quinlan 
Your committee appointed to review the 
uniform commercial code has completed its assignment 
and submits the accompanying final report and recom-
mendations thereon. 
The committee has reviewed the draft of 
the proposed uniform commercial code which has been 
prepared by the Uniform Commercial Code Committee of 
the Colorado Bar Association. The members of your 
committee were not only impressed with the presentation 
made of the code, but we were even more impressed with 
the amount of work which had gone into its preparation. 
We would therefore like to take this opportunity to 
express our gratitude to Mr. David J. Clarke, chairman 
of the bar association's committee, and to the numerous 
members of his committee. 
As may be noted in the accompanying report 
of committee findings and recommendations, your com-
mittee recommends the favorable consideration of the 
proposed code in the 1965 session. Care should be taken, 
however, to retain its uniformity with the codes of other 
states and, if adopted, the code should be located in 
one chapter of our revised statutes. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JDhn W. Nichols, Chairman 
Committee on Uniform 
Commercial Code 
FOREWORD 
The Legislative Council's Committee on Uniform Commercial Code 
was created under the provisions of House Joint Resolution No. 1030, 
1964 regular session, with the understanding that it would essentially 
be a legislative committee which would review the work of the Colorado 
Bar Association's Committee on Uniform Commercial Code. Appointed to 
the Legislative Council committee were Representative John W. Nichols, 
chairman; Senator Carl W. Fulghum, vice chairman; Senators Donald 
Kelley, Ranger Rogers, and Joe Shoemaker; and Representatives Lowell 
B. Compton, T. H. Dameron, William Griffith, Frank Kemp, Ben Klein, 
Vincent Massari, and Joseph Schieffelin. Representative C. P. Lamb, 
chairman of the Legislative Council, also served as an ex officio 
member of the committee. 
The results of the work of the bar association's committee were 
provided the members of the Legislative Council committee early in 
October. These materials included the draft of the proposed uniform 
commercial code for Colorado and related information on its contents, 
and the procedures which had been followed in preparing this draft. 
As a result of a two-day meeting with representatives of the bar 
association's committee and other interested persons, our committee 
concluded that the proposed draft should be recommended for favorable 
consideration in the 1965 session. 
This publication includes the report of the Legislative Council 
committee on this proposal, together with accompanying explanatory 
materials on the uniform commercial code; however, the proposed draft 
of the code has not been included because of its size. The Colorado 
Bar Association has a limited supply of these drafts, and its Uniform 
Commercial Code Committee will provide these to interested persons 
and groups, as well as speakers to discuss the provisions of this code. 
All members of the Forty-fifth General Assembly will be provided with 
drafts of the code in advance of the 1965 session. 
Assisting the Legislative Council's committee were James C. 
Wilson, Jr., assistant attorney general assigned to the Legislative 
Reference Office, and Phillip E. Jones, senior research analyst. 
November 4, 1964 
vii 
Lyle C. Kyle 
Director 
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UNIFORM CO1WAERCIAL CODE COMMITTEE REPORT 
Under the provisions of House Joint Resolution No. 1030, 1964 
regular session, the Legislative Council was given discretionary 
authority to appoint a committee to review the proposed uniform com-
mercial code being prepared by the Colorado Bar Association. On the 
assumption that the bar association would complete its work on a 
draft of the code, the Council appointed its committee following 
adjournment of the 1964 session. 
Committee Procedures 
Members of the Council committee met with members of the 
Uniform Commercial Code Committee of the Colorado Bar Association on 
May 2nd, 1964, to review the study and drafting procedures which had 
been worked out by the bar association committee and to hear a dis-
cussion on the uniform commercial code by a member of the New Mexico 
Uniform State Laws Commission. The bar association committee reported 
that the annotation work necessary for its review of the uniform com-
mercial code was being carried out by students of the Denver University 
School of Law. When this material became available, the work on the 
draft itself would be conducted by subcommittees assigned various of 
the ten articles of the code. (Appendix D contains a list of the 
members of the bar association who worked on this project.) 
The bar association committee reported that its completed 
draft would be submitted to the association's Board of Governors and, 
if approved, would be submitted to the Legislative Council committee 
for consideration early in the fall. 
The Legislative Council committee met on October 22nd and 
23rd to review the bar association committee's proposed draft of a 
uniform commercial code for Colorado and to provide an opportunity for 
interested persons ond organizations to present their views to the com-
mittee on this draft. Much of these two days was devoted to comparing 
the proposed draft with present Colorado law and to discussing technical 
and procedural problems involved with the adoption of such a code in 
Colorado. Few persons, other than those attorneys who had worked on 
the code, appeared to discuss the proposed code with the committee. 
Committee Findings 
The uniform commercial code is the result of more than 20 years 
of intensive study, drafting, and refining by its sponsors -- the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the 
American Law Institute in collaboration with a number of committees of 
the American Bar Association and other interested groups and trade 
organizations. ,~ditional study and consideration has been given this 
code by the 29 states and the District of Columbia that have adopted it. 
These 29 states, which include Colorado's neighboring states of New 
Mexico, Oklahoma, Nebraska, and Wyoming, are listed in the following 
tabulation in the order in which they adopted the code: 
Adoption 
State Date Effective Date 
Pennsylvania 1953 July l, 1954 
Massachusetts 1957 October l, 1958 
Kentucky 1958 July 1, 1960 
Connecticut 1959 October l, 1961 
New Hampshire 1959 July 1, 1961 
Rhode Island 1960 January 2, 1962 
Wyoming 1961 January 2, 1962 
Arkansas 1961 January l, 1962 
New Mexico 1961 January l, 1962 
Ohio 1961 July l, 1962 
Oregon 1961 September 1, 1963 
Oklahoma 1961 January l, 1963 
Illinois 1961 July 2, 1962 
New Jersey 1961 January 1, 1963 
Georgia 1962 January 1, 1964 
Alaska 1962 January 1, 1963 
New York 1962 September 27, 1964 
Michigan 1962 January 1, 1964 
Indiana 1963 July l, 1964 
Tennessee 1963 July 1, 1964 
West Virginia 1963 July l, 1964 
Montana 1963 January 2, 1965 
Maryland 1963 February 1, 1964 
California 1963 January 1, 1965 
Wisconsin 1963 July l, 1965 
Maine 1963 December 31, 1964 
Nebraska 1963 September 2, 1965 
Missouri 1963 July l, 1965 
District of Columbia 1963 January l, 1965 
Virginia 1964 January l, 1966 
Appendix A contains a report prepared by the bar association 
committee on the background and provisions of the uniform commercial 
code. This report notes that the code consolidates in one enactment 
and brings up to date and makes more certain present statutory com-
mercial law in areas now covered by eitht old uniform acts, five of 
which have been adopted in Colorado, and also a variety of other ron-
uniform commercial statutes. Because of easier and more rapid com-
munication and transportation in this nation, and because industrial 
empires have grown and become more decentralized and scattered in the 
process, without regard to state lines, the need and demand for 
uniformity in commercial law and dealings has become more pronounced. 
The uniform commercial code has been prepared as an answer to this 
demand. 
There are a number of other reasons which have been considered 
as to why the uniform commercial code · should be adopted in Colorado. 
Colorado's present commercial statutory laws are outmoded and are not 
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I 
in keeping with modern commercial practices, and a revision thereof 
would be highly desirable. These present statutes also are extremely 
uncertain in many respects because of inconsistencies in the law 
itself or because of inconsistent interpretations thereof, as well as 
having areas where there is no statutory coverage whatsoever in this 
state. 
Perhaps the overriding reason for the enactment of the -code is 
the fact that it has been adopted in so many states, including such 
highly industrialized and commercial states as Connecticut, Illinois, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, 
and the commercial transactions between business and financial 
institutions in these and the other 21 states and similar institutions 
in Colorado would be greatly facilitated and enhanced if Colorado were 
to adopt the uniform commercial code. In this connection, one of the 
persons appearing before the Council committee stated that insurance 
companies as well as banks are more willing to make loans in states 
having the uniform commercial code. 
The comparison of the proposed uniform commercial code pro-
visions with present Colorado law, included in Appendix B, was reviewed 
at length by members of the Council committee with representatives of 
the bar association subcommittees which had worked on these provisions. 
Because of the lack of time, the committee did not review the proposed 
draft of the code section by section with these representatives; however, 
the committee concluded that because of the highly-technical nature of 
the substantive provisions in the code, such a review would be of 
little value. Further, the committee felt that the work that had been 
done by members of the bar association on the proposed code in effect 
represented the same services which normally would be provided by the 
committee's staff, and that the committee members must place their 
faith in the work which the attorneys had done, much the same as they do 
with the work of their own staff. 
During the article-by-article comparison with present Colorado 
law, the need for uniformity with code provisions in other states was 
stressed. In this respect, bar association subcommittees had the advice 
of the UCC Permanent Editorial Board and before any changes were made 
in the draft for Colorado, the subcommittees would correspond with this 
board for their comments. (A file of this correspondence has been kept 
by the bar association.) Moreover, it was also pointed out that the 
need for uniformity applies to section numbers as well as language 
within the code. (Appendix E includes an article which treats this 
need for uniformity in some detail.) 
As a result of this comparison, the committee found that the 
code draft had been exhaustively researched by the bar association com-
mittee members, as well as by others, and that its provisions had 
already been reviewed by some commercial groups. The Colorado Bankers' 
Association, for example, hdd adopted a resolution in support of the 
adoption of the uniform commercial code by the General Assembly. The 
&ar association committee plans additional exposure of its draft to 
i hterested groups and associations between now and the 1965 session. 
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Committee Recommendations 
1. The committee recommends that favorable consideration be 
given in the 1965 session to the"draft of the uniform commercial code 
prepared by the Uniform Commercial Code Committee of the Colorado Bar 
Association. The committee believes that no further interim legislative 
consideration is needed of this draft and that the members of the 
General Assembly, because of the tremendous size of this proposal and 
because of its highly technical nature, may agree with this committee 
that the acceptance of this code will be based, to a large extent, on 
faith in the abilities and knowledge of those persons who have devoted 
considerable time to its preparation, not only in Colorado but in the 
29 other states in the nation which have adopted this code. 
2. The committee recommends that the members of the General 
Assembly carefully consider any proposed amendments to the code which 
would change its uniformity. Much of the advantage in adopting this 
code for Colorado rests with its having uniform provisions governing 
commercial actions, and hastily-drawn amendments to the proposed code 
would serve to defeat this purpose, as well as possibly jeopardizing 
its chances of being enacted. In the interests of uniformity with 
the code as adopted in other states, the committee suggests that the 
numbering system for sections as used in Colorado be retained but that 
the section numbers as contained in the uniform commercial code be 
included in parentheses following the Colorado section numbers. 
3. The committee recommends that. if adopted. the uniform 
commercial code be maintained as a separate chapter in the Colorado 
Revised Statutes. The proposed code is a consolidated body of law and 
should be located in our statutes as such. 
4. The committee recommends that the Colorado Bar Association 
continue to provide as widespread publicity as possible to interested 
groups and associations on the provisions in the proposed uniform 
commercial code. Because of its size, this report does not include 
a copy of the proposed code, but the bar association has a number of 
prepared copies and it has speakers available for any group or associ-




(Prepared by the Uniform Commercial Code Committee 
of the Colorado Bar Association) 
WHAT VERY BRIEFLY IS THE CODE? 
The uniform commercial code consolidates in one enactment and 
brings up to date and makes more certain our present statutory com-
mercial law in areas now covered by eight old uniform acts, five of 
which were adopted in Colorado, and also by a variety of other non-
uniform commercial statutes. 
It consists of ten articles, Article l contains general 
provisions and definitions common to the entire code. Article 10 
contains the formal effective date and repealer provisions. 
Between these two articles are eight other· articles, each deal-
ing with a specific and particular phase of commercial activity and 
substantive commercial law. The concept of the code is that "commercial 
transactions" is a single subject of the law notwithstanding its many 
facets. 
The basic and essential fact of all commerce·, the focal point 
of all commercial activity, is the sale and purchase of · goods. Article 
2 entitled ''Sales" deals therewith. Payment for the goods sold may be 
through the medium of a check, note or draft. Article 3 · is entitled 
"Commercial Paper'' and covers such instruments. Th~ ch~ck, note or 
draft or other similar paper, _ may be negotiated and p;ass through one or 
more banks for collection. Article 4 entitled "Bank Deposits and 
Coll~ctions" supplements Article 3 in this respect. The sale may be 
pursuant to a letter of credit and Article 5 deals with and is entitled 
"Letters of Credit". The sale of the goods may be in ordinary course 
of business or may possibly be a bulk transfer. Article 6 entitled 
"Bulk Transfers" covers this type of transaction. Transportation or 
storage of the goods sold may entail the use of a bill of lading or 
warehouse receipt or both. Hence Article 7 entitled "Documents of 
Title" is included to cover such arrangements. Since Article 3 dealing 
with commercial paper excludes certain defined investment securities, 
Article 8 entitled "Investment Securities" is included to cover invest-
ment paper. The goods, as well as other types of personal property, 
either in the hands of the seller or the buyer, before, a~ part of or 
after sale may serve as collateral for security purposes, and hence 
the code includes Article 9 entitled "Secured Transactions.~ 
Every phase of commerce involved is but a part of one trans-
action, namely, the sale of and payment for the goods. The code deals 
with all the phases which may ordinarily arise in the handling of a 
commercial transaction, from start to finish. 
THE ORIGIN~ REASONS THEREFOR, AND DRAFTING OF THE CODE 
This code represents more than twenty years of intensive 
study, drafting and refining by its jponsors, the National Conference 
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Law Institute 
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in collaboration with a number of committees of the American Bar Associ-
ation and other interested groups and trade organizations. Over this 
period of time, thousands of lawyers, law school professors, judges and 
business men have played a part, ·some large, some small, in the develop-
ment of this final product. 
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
is a body of three to five lawyers from each state which was originally 
organized in the 1890's to promote uniformity of State legislation. 
Since its organization, the commissioners have promulgated over orae 
hundred uniform acts, including a number in the field of commercial 
law. The first was the Negotiable Instruments Act promulgated in 
1896, followed, among others, by the Sales Act and the Warehouse 
Receipts Act, both in 1906, the Bills of Lading Act and the Stock 
Transfer Act, both in 1909, the Conditional Sales Act in 1918, the 
Fiduciaries Act in 1922, and the Trust Receipts Act in 1933. 
Colorado has never enacted the Bills of Lading Act, the Trust 
Receipts Act, or the Conditional Sales Act. 
Since promulgation of the above mentioned uniform acts, mostly 
over fifty years ago, only the Negotiable Instruments Act and the Ware-
house Receipts Act have been enacted in all American jurisdictions. 
However, with respect to the former, approximately eighty instances of 
conflicting interpretation by the courts have been documented so that 
uniformity even in this area of universal enactment is really non-
existent. With respect to the latter, uniform amendments promulgated 
in 1922 have been adopted in only about sixteen jurisdictions so that 
in this area again there is no real uniformity. 
The Sales Act has been enacted in about thirty-six jurisdictions, 
but again uniform amendments promulgated in 1922 have been adopted in 
only eleven of these thirty-six jurisdictions so that there is no 
uniformity in this area. 
The mere age of these various acts indicates the real need for 
revision. It is also obvious from their lack of wide acceptance that 
piece-meal proposals or separate revisions of the existing uniform acts 
will not promote uniformity of legislation. 
Aside from these uniform acts there are innumerable other 
statutes dealing with commercial subjects but with substantial differences 
among the states. For example, there is the Bank Collection Code enacted 
in Colorado in 1957. That code was based upon the recommended code of 
the American Bankers A~sociation. There also is a great variety of 
chattel security statutes such as those relating to chattel mortgages, 
factor's liens, trust receipts, and many other types of lien statutes. 
As far back as the 1920's. dissatisfaction with the Uniform 
Sales Act reached the stage of public expression. Uniform amendments 
promulgated in 1922 did not solve all of the problems. Continued and 
growing dissatisfaction culminated in the drafting of a revision to 
apply to and regulate interstate sales only. This revision was intro-
duced in the Congress of the United States in 1940 (H.R. 8176, 76th 
Congress, 2nd Session). 
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It was thought the enactment of this measure, applicable to 
interstate sales, would compel the states to adopt a similar revision. 
Obviously, if this did not happen~ a statute regulating interstate 
sales only would create a chaotic condition, worse than the existing 
evil, with one set of laws governing interstate sales and another 
set governing intrastate sales, with considerable doubt at the 
inception of any given transaction as to which law applied. It was 
this agitation for reform that triggered the idea ~fa uniform .com-
mercial code to revise not only the Uniform Sales Act but other 
commercial statutes as well which from mere lapse of time had become 
out-moded. Out of this came the arrangement in 1940 between the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Law 
Institute to undertake the study and drafting necessary to develop the 
code. 
As we more and more after 1900 became ''One Country" by reason 
of easier and more rapid communication and and transportation, as our 
industrial empire grew and expanded and in the process became more 
decentralized and scattered without reference to state lines, the need 
and demand for uniformity in commercial areas became more pronounced. 
The sponsoring organizations in 1940 assembled a research 
staff under a chief reporter with ample financial aid secured from the 
Falk Foundation. The preliminary research to determine existing law 
and actual commercial practices was done by the staff which in turn 
reported with a draft of the proposed statutory provision to an advisory 
committee of lawyers, judges, law school professors, and business 
people. After discussion and criticism at this level, the matter would 
be referred back to the staff for reworking to come again to the advisory 
committee. This was a continuing back and forth process over many 
years and in its normal routine thousands of persons were consulted, 
conf~icting views reconciled, etc. 
At least twice a year, when the drafting had reached a point 
for presentation to the entire membership of the commissioners, it was 
so submitted and again underwent critical scrutiny. The same process 
of submission was followed frequently with the Council of the Law 
Institute and at least once a year with the membership of that institute. 
The sales article was initially completed around 1942. The 
remaining work was slowed somewhat by reason of the war but was under-
taken afresh in 1945. It was at this time that various committees of 
the American Bar Association interested themselves in the project for 
the purpose of scrutinizing the work being done. 
The code as a completely integrated whole made its first appear-
ande in 1949. Objection to this first draft resulted in a complete 
re-examination of the project, with public hearings being held by the 
editorial board of the sponsoring organizations. From 1949 to 1952 the 
code went through several complete revisions and then in 1952 was 
finally approved by the commissioners and the Law Institute and the 
American Bar Association. It was this draft which was enacted in 
Pennsylvania in 1953, effective July 1, 1954. 
This enactment lead to official minute and detailed studies of 
the code in a number of other states: The most thorough of these was 
that conducted by the New York Law Revision Commission with an appropria-
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tion in excess of $100,000. The New York Commission assembled a staff 
of experts not previously identified with the code project and took 
approximately three years to con~lude its study of the 19S2 draft. Its 
conslusion with respect to that draft was that the code was a ~orth~ 
while undertaking that th~ codification of law in the commercial field 
was desirable bui that the draft then under consideration was not yet 
in sati sf acto;y form for enactment, al though the commission did . approve 
of many of the basic and fundamental theories underlying the code. Of 
course, since then the code was revised in 1958 and this revision was 
enacted in New York in 1962. 
In addition to the New York and equally-detailed studies in 
other states, the Pennsylvania State Chamber of Commerce initiated a 
program of re-examination of the code through a committee representing 
all segments of commerce, industry and banking in that state. 
At the same time the sponsoring organizations enlarged their 
editorial board which set up several subcommittees with respect to the 
various articles of the code for purposes of a re-consideration in 
collaboration with the other studies then being made. 
All of this rather intensive activity resulted in the 19~8 
Revised Code which with the 1962 changes is embodied in the act recom-
mended by the committee. 
THE REASONS FOR THE APPROVAL OF THE 
CODE BY YOUR COMMITTEE 
l. Practically all of our present commercial statutory law was 
drafted, promulgated, and enacted more than fifty years ago. Since then 
there has been a tremendous growth in commercial activity and many new 
patterns and practices have developed. In short, these present statutes 
are outmoded, are not in keeping with current commercial practices, and 
a revision thereof is highly desirable. 
2. Our present commercial statutory law is in many respects 
extremely uncertain because of inconsistencies in the law itself or 
because of inconsistent interpretations thereof. There are also areas 
where there is no statutory coverage whatsoever. 
For example, any attempt to predetermine rights or risks in a 
sales transaction under the Uniform Sales Act is uncertain where such 
rights or risks depend on who has title to the goods since this in 
turn depends on the presumed intent of the parties to be determined 
factually. 
In addition to the above-mentioned almost eighty instances where 
conflicting interpretations have developed in the area of negotiable 
instruments, there is uncertainty as to whether the Uniform Negotiable 
Instruments Act applies to corporate debt obligations which do not 
literally conform to the statutory requirements for negotiability but 
as to which there are substantial economic reasons why they should be 
treated as negotiable. 
Aside from the need for modernizing, there is a real need for a 
revision of our commercial statutes in the interest of simplicity, 
clarity, and certainty. 
- 8 -
Section 1-107 provides that any claim or right arising out of 
an alleged breach can be discharged in whole, or in part, without con-
sideration by a written waiver ~r renunciation signed and delivered 
by the aggrieved party. This probably constitutes a change in the 
law of Colorado. 
Article I also contains general definitions and principles of 
interpretation. Special definitions for succeeding articles are set 
forth in those articles. The words defined will be discussed in 
connection with their use throughout the code; their meaning in the 
abstract has no significance. 
Section 1-206 provipes a statute of frauds limitation of 
$5,000 for personal property other than (1) goods as defined in Section 
2-201 (where the limitation is $500), or (2) securities where no dollar 
limitation is set forth (Section 8-319), or (3) security agreements 
which have no dollar limitation (Sectio~ 9-203). The statute of frauds 
relating to the sale of goods will increase the amount from $50 to $500. 
The adoption of the uniform commercial code in Colorado would 
require the repeal of the following uniform acts and other laws which 
were adopted in Colorado on the dates indicated, as well as miscel-
laneous other statutes: 
Uniform Sales Act 
Negotiable Instruments Law 
Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act 
Uniform Stock Transfer Act 
Uniform Fiduciaries Act 
Bulk Sales Act, as amended in 
Colorado Banking Code, as amended in 








In general, present Colorado statutes do not contain statements 
of principles of the kind discussed above. To the extent that such 
principles will become a part of our statutory law if the code is 
adopted in Colorado, they will constitute new guides for the supreme 
court in cases involving interpretations of the succeeding articles. 
ARTICLE 2 - SALES 
I. What Article 2 does. 
Article 2 applies to transactions in sales of goods. "Goods" 
includes movables and growing crops and such items as timber and 
minerals when they are to be removed from the real estate by the seller. 
It does not include non-movables, investment securities and rights of 
action or transfers which are intended only as security. 
II. Formation of Contract. 
A. Statute of Frauds. The writing relied on to satisfy the 
statute of frauds is not insufficient merely because it omits or 
incorrectly states the terms. The only limitation is that the contract 
is not enforceable beyond the quantity of goods shown in the writing. 
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As between 11 merchants 11 (that is, persons familiar with this 
type of transaction) when a letter confirming the contract is received, 
failure to deny in writing withi~ ten days will render the letter a 
sufficient writing against the recipient as well as the sender. 
As to part payment and also part acceptance, the code permits 
enforcement of an oral contract only to the extent of the goods paid 
for and accepted as opposed to the existing law whereupon enforcement 
and the entire contract would result. 
Contracts subject to the statute of frauds would be those 
greater than $500 as opposed to the present law of $50. 
B. Indefiniteness. A contract will not fail for indefiniteness 
even though one or more terms are left open, provided that there is a 
reasonably certain basis for · supply the missing term. 
C, Firm Offers. A written promise to hold an offer open will 
be enforced according to its terms for a period not to exceed three 
months if the promise is made and signed by the "merchant" even if the 
offer is not supported by independent consideration. 
D. Counter-Offers. The effect of an acceptance is not destroy-
ed though additional terms are stated, unless the acceptance is expressly 
made conditional on the offerors assent to the additional terms. The 
additional terms are viewed as mere proposals for additions to the con-
tract except that, where the parties are merchants then the additional 
terms do not materially alter the original offer, the additional terms 
become part of the contract unless the other party indicates his 
objections within a reasonable time. 
E. Acceptance of Offer - Generally, Offers are to be construed 
as inviting acceptance in any reasonable manner, rejecting the require-
ments that the acceptince be transmitted by the same medium by which 
the offer was made. 
F, Unilateral Contracts. The offeree has no power to accept 
by performance unless he notifies the offerer within a reasonable time 
that he intends to accept. When the offerer asks for current shipment, 
shipment of non-conforming goods constitutes both an acceptance and a 
breach. 
G, Modification of Contract, An agreement made in good faith 
modifying a contract does not need consideration to be binding. 
III, Interpretation and Performance, 
A, Assignments, 1. Rights. Unless the contract expressly 
prohibits assignment of rights, or unless the assignment would materially 
increase the other party's burdens, all rights of buyer or seller may 
be assigned. Rights arising from the other party's breach of contract 
or from the assignor's due performance of his entire obligation may be 
assigned despite contrary provisions in the contract. 
2. Duties may be assigned if .the other party has no substantial 
interest in having the assignor perform personally. 
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B. Warranties. 1. Types of( Warranties. a. Express War-
ranties. Express warranties include the warilanty that the goods 
will be of the type dese.ribed in the contlraot and the similar war-
ranty that the goods will conform to any, sample or model which was 
the basis for the contract. The code d~parts from the sales act in 
omitting any requirement that the buyer prove his reliance upon an 
express warranty. 
b. Warranties of Title. The sel,ter implied! y warrants that 
he has power to convey good title and that the goods will be delivered 
free of any encumbrance unknown to the buyer at the time of contracting 
and that the goods will be delivered free of any claim or infringement 
except when the goods have been manufactured in compliance with specifi-
cations furnished by the buyer. · 
c. Implied Warranties. (1) Warranty of Merchantability. A 
warranty of merchantability arises whenever goods are sold by a person 
whose occupation is to sell goods of that type. Merchantability is 
the fair average quality of and uniformity and specifically includes 
food or drink to be consumed on the premises. 
(2) Warranty of Fitness for a Particular Purpose. This arises 
when a seller has reason to know that the buyer intends to use the 
goods for a particular purpose and the buyer is relying on the seller's 
skill or judgment. 
2. Persons to whom Warranties Extend. The code leaves the 
privity questions for a case to case determination except that a sel-
ler's warranties extend to the family and household of the buyer and 
certain quests if it is reasonable to expect that such a person may 
use the goods. 
3. Limitation of Warranties. A court is permitted to refuse 
to enforce any clause of a contract that was unconscionable at the time 
it was made. This concept of unconscionability probably does not refer 
to comparative bargaining power but to prevention of unfair surprise. 
Apart from the unconscionability section, the code sets out specifically 
the manner in which each type of warranty may be limited. 
An express warranty and a limitation of warranty liability are 
to be construed as consistent, if possible, but when such construction 
is impossible the express warranty will prevail. 
The implied warranty of title (and the warranty against in-
fringement) can be excluded or modified by specific language or by cer-
tain circumstances, such as sales under execution or by foreclosing 
lienors, indicating that the seller intends to sell only on a quit-claim 
basis. 
Other implied warranties can be excluded or modified by the 
trade usage or course of dealings and by expressions such as "with all 
faults." If the limitation is in writing, the writing must be conspicu-
ous and the warranty of fitness for a particular use can be limited 
only in writing. 
C. Delivery. When the contract is entirely silent as to 
delivery, the place of delivery is the seller's place of business. 
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When the goods are in the hands of a bailee and the goods are not to 
be moved, tender of delivery is achieved by tender to the buyer of a 
negotiable document of title or QY the bailee's acknowledgment of the 
buyer's rights to possession. When the goods are to be given to a 
carrier the delivery obligation depends upon whether the contract is a 
shipment contract or a destination contract. The determination as to 
whether a contract is a shipment or destination contract does not 
depend upon which party pays the shipping costs. Rather, contracts are 
presumed to be shipment contracts until the contrary is proven. 
D. Consequences of Non-Conforming Delivery. If delivery fails 
in any respect to conform to the contract the buyer may reject the 
tender in part or in whole. This is, however, limited as follows: 
1. Cure. Until the time for performance has expired, the 
seller may "cure" by subsequent tender of conforming delivery. After 
the expiration of the time for performance the seller is entitled to 
cure if he had reason to believe that the original tender would have 
been acceptable. A non-conformity capable of cure must be communicated 
by the buyer to the seller with specificity. 
2. Substantial performance. Once a buyer has accepted the 
goods, he may revoke acceptance only if the nonconformity substantially 
impairs the value of the contract. In an installment contract the 
buyer may reject only the nonconforming installment unless the noncon-
formity, together with any prior nonconformities that may have occurred, 
substantially impairs the value of the entire contract. 
3. Substituted performance. If the goods are damaged without 
fault of either party and before risk of loss has passed to the buyer, 
the buyer may cancel the contract or accept the goods with due allowance 
in the price, but he may not treat the contract as breached. When de-
livery is delayed or rendered commercially impractical by an event 
whose non-occurrence was a basic as$umption of the contract, the buyer 
has the alternative of cancelling the contract or of accepting a reduced 
or delayed performance. However, no breach will have occurred. When 
the agreed manner of delivery has become commercially impractical, the 
buyer must accept a reasonable substitute. 
E. Risk of Loss and Insurable Interest. Risk of loss hinged 
on the location of "title'' is rejected under the code; rather, risk of 
loss is governed by the delivery obligation, in the absence of breach 
or contrary agreement. 
Where the seller breaches a contract by tendering nonconforming 
goods, the risk of loss remains on the seller until cure or acceptance. 
However, once the buyer has accepted, even though he may rightfully re-
voke acceptance, risk of loss rests on seller only to the extent the 
buyer's insurance is adequate. Correspondingly, when prior to delivery 
the buyer breaches a contract, risk of loss passes to buyer only to 
the extent that the seller's insurance is inadequate. 
The buyer's insurable interest arises as soon as existing goods 
are identified to the contract and the seller's insurable interest 
continues so long as the seller retains any security interest in the 
goods. 
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F. Payment. Payment is presumed to be due only after the 
buyer has had an opportunity to inspect the goods. 
When the contract calls for payment against documents, the 
buyer is not entitled to inspect before payment is due. The payment 
here in no way limits the buyer's remedies if the goods are nonconform-
ing. 
Any manner of payment may be used which is current in the 
ordinary course of business. Payment by check is conditional upon 
honor on due presentment. 
G. Assurance of Performance. A buyer or seller who has 
reasonable ground for doubting the ability or willingness of the other 
party to perform may demand adequate assuranc_e of performance from the 
other party. 
IV. Remedies. 
A. Acceptance. Acceptance occurs whenever, after a reasonable 
opportunity to inspect, the buyer notifies the seller that the goods 
are conforming or that the goods will be accepted despite conformity. 
The buyer will be deemed to have accepted the goods if he fails to 
object within a reasonable time or if he treats the goods in a manner 
inconsistent with the seller's ownership. 
B. Sellers's Remedy in the Absence of Acceptance. If the 
buyer's rejection is proper, the buyer must nevertheless hold the goods 
under reasonable care for a long enough time to permit removal by the 
seller. h'hen the buyer deals in goods of the type rejected, he must 
honor reasonable instructions from the seller as to disposition of the 
good·s and, in the absence of such instructions, he must sell the goods 
for the seller's account if the goods are subject to rapid decline in 
value. 
When the buyer has breached the contract without having ac-
cepted the goods, the seller's remedies fall into two categories: 
1. Remedies which reach directly to the goods themselves --
the seller may withhold delivery or if the goods are in the hands of a 
bailee he may, as against the buyer, "stop in transit" at any time 
prior to delivery. If the breach occurs before the manufacture of the 
goods has been completed, the seller may complete the goods without 
violating any rule against litigation or damages. If the buyers breach 
occurs when he is insolvent, the seller, under certain circumstances, 
may recover the goods even after delivery and acceptance. 
2. Remedies which allow monetary damages -- the seller has 
the alternative of suing for damages as computed by ''resale," or of 
suing for "damages for non-acceptance." As to the former, on learning 
of the breach, the seller may, subject to specified safeguards, sell 
the goods at public or private sale, and then sue for the difference 
between the contract price and the resale price. The seller may retain 
any profit. Alternatively the seller may sue for "damages for non-
acceptance," such damages being measured by the difference between the 
contract price and the market price at time and place for delivery, 
allowing such additional damages as necessary to put the seller in as 
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good a position as he would have been had there been performance. An 
action for price is not permitted unless it can be shown that resale 
is impossible or that the goods have been damaged after risk of loss 
has passed to the buyer. 
C. Sellers Remedies on Acceptance. Once the goods have been 
accepted, the seller has standing to maintain an action for the price 
even though the seller may have also breached the contract. The 
buyer's claim must be asserted by way of counterclaim rather than de-
fense. 
D. Buyer's Remedies in the Absence of Acceptance. 1. Remedies 
reaching goods. a. Goods rejected for non-conformity. The buyer is 
given a possessory security interest to the extent of payments on the 
purchase price, inspection costs, and expenses incurred pursuant to the 
buyer's duty to dispose of rightfully rejected goods. To satisfy this 
security interest, the buyer has the rights of resale. 
b. Specific Performance. Buyer has a right to obtain specific 
goods identified to the contract if comparable goods cannot be procured 
elsewhere or if they have been "shipped under reservation 11 and payment 
has been tendered. 
2. Damages. The buyer is given the alternative of suing for 
damages as computed by 11 cover 11 or for "damages for non-delivery." 
"Cover" is the buyer's right to purchase substitute goods within a 
reasonable time after learning of the seller's breach. He may th~n sue 
the seller for the difference between the cover price and the contract 
price. 11 Damages for non-delivery" are defined as the difference between 
the market price at the time the buyer learned of the breach and the 
contract price. This changes the existing law which provided that the 
relevant market price was that prevailing at the time delivery should 
have been made. Additionally, the buyer may also recover consequential 
damages which are any losses resulting from the buyer's business posi-
tion which the seller had reason to know at the time of contracting. 
The buyer is under duty to mitigate consequential damages. 
E. Buyer's Remedies after Acceptance. The measure of damages 
is the loss resulting in ordinary course from the breach. Where the 
defect is also a breach of warranty, the measure of damages normally 
to be applied is the difference between the value of the goods as war-
ranted and the value as accepted. Value is computed as of the time and 
place of acceptance. Consequential damages may also be recovered. 
F. Contractual Limitations on Remedies. A reasonable amount 
of liquidated damages is permitted. Also, the parties may limit the 
type of remedies that may be resorted to, although when circumstances 
cause a limited remedy to fail of its purpose, the limitation may be 
repudiated. Parties are permitted to limit or exclude consequential 
damages, but such limitations are expressly subject to the "unconscion-
ability section." 
G. Statute of Limitations. An action for breach of any con-
tract for sale of goods must be commenced within four years rather than 
the six-year period which is now the law in Colorado. Furthermore, by 
the original agreem~nt the parties may reduce the period of limitations 
to not less than one year, but may not extend the period. 
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V. Third Persons. 
A. Creditors of the Seller. A buyer who has paid a part of 
of the price for goods identified to the contract may recover the 
goods from the seller on tender of the balance of the price, provided 
that the seller has become insolvent within ten days after he first 
received payment from the buyer. This right to recover the goods is 
superior to the rights of the seller's creditors, except for rights 
they obtain under Article 9 of the code, or unless the identification 
of the goods to the contract, or the seller's retention of possession, 
amounts to a fraudulent transfer or voidable preference. The uniform 
code would subject the recl~iming seller to prior rights of a lien 
creditor. The Colorado proposal follows the code as enacted in New 
York, California, Illinois, New Mexico, and Maine and which does not 
give the lien creditor this superior right. This will avoid changing 
the existing Colorado law as found in In re Appel Suit and Cloak Co., 
198 F. 2d 322 and see In re Kravitz, 278 F. 2d 820. 
B. The Creditors of the Buyer. A seller may recover goods 
received on credit by the buyer when insolvent if demand for the goods 
is made within ten days after the goods are received. If, however, 
the seller has received from the buyer a written misrepresentation of 
solvency within three months prior to delivery of the goods, then the 
ten-day limitation does not apply. This right is superior to the 
right of the buyer's creditors unless these creditors have a security 
interest. 
Sellers can no longer rely on the so-called "sale on consign-
ment" to protect their security interests in goods sold for resale. 
A sale where title is purported to be reserved in the seller until 
resale does not give the seller or consignor a right superior to the 
buyer's creditors unless there is compliance with Article 9. 
C. Good Faith Purchases From the_Buyer. The seller's power 
to recover the goods is defeated by resale to a buyer who has no 
knowledge of the seller's interest and who purchases in the ordinary 
course of the business. 
ARTICLE 3 - COMMERCIAL PAPER 
Article 3 of the uniform commercial code is a precise and 
concise revision of the oldest of the uniform laws, the Negotiable 
Instruments Law, which was adopted in Colorado in 1897. Changes in 
commercial language and practice during the nearly 70 years since the 
NIL was drafted, together with inconsistent court interpretations of 
many sections causing a lack of uniformity in the law, have resulted in 
a need for an up-dating of that statute. Article 3 is thoroughly 
integrated with the remainder of the code so that the rules governing 
the law of commercial paper are part of a consistent pattern of com-
mercial law. 
Although Article 3 of the code is considerably shorter than 
the NIL, the logical arrangement of the sections makes it an easier 
statute to work with than the NIL. This contribution, perhaps most 
significant in Article 3, overshadows any changes in the law effected 
by the article, although such changes do exist, some of the more 
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significant of which are noted below. Article 3 continues the policy 
of the NIL of promoting the free flow of commercial paper which is 
used so extensively as a substitute for money. 
The following sections of the code may be noted as either 
changing the law of the NIL or specifying a rule where none existed 
under the NIL: 
1. UCC Section 3-105 sets forth rules as to when a promise or 
order is unconditional (a requirement of negotiability), and provides 
that a reference in an instrument to some other document does not 
render the promise or order conditional unless the instrument is spe-
cifically made "subject to" the other document. 
2. UCC Section 3-109 resolves certain problems which arose 
under the NIL as to the negotiability of an instrument the payable 
date of which is subject to acceleration or extension, favoring negoti-
ability in both instances. However, the NIL rule that an instrument 
is negotiable which is payable upon an event uncertain as to time of 
occurrence is reversed. 
3. The committee has recommended adoption of alternative B of 
UCC Section 3-121 providing that "A note or acceptance which states 
that it is payable at a bank is not of itself an order or authorization 
to the bank to.pay it. 11 Although this reverses the rule of CRS 1953, 
95-1-87, it conforms to the rule adopted by the majority of the . 
western states which have adopted the code and is believed to conform 
to the actual practice followed by Colorado banks. 
4. UCC Section 3-204 changes the "once bearer paper always 
bearer paper" rule under the NIL. See CRS 1953, 95-1-40. Under UCC 
Section 3-204 any instrument specially indorsed becomes payable to the 
order of the special indorsee and may be further negotiated only by · 
his indorsement. 
5. UCC Section 3-302 defines the requirements of a holder in 
due course, eliminating the requirement that the instrument be com-
plete and regular on its face, but achieves much the same result in 
that it must be ·taken "in good faith." Subsection (2) states that a 
payee may be a holder in due course, resolving the question which 
existed under the NIL. 
6. UCC Section 3-304 is more explicit than CRS 1953, 95-1-55 
and 56, as to what constitutes notice of a defect prohibiting a 
purchaser from obtaining the status of a holder in due course. 
7. UCC Section 3-406 is new and places the burden of loss 
resulting from a material alteration or unauthorized signature on any 
party who, by his negligence, contributes to the alteration or making 
of the unauthorized signature. 
8. UCC Sections 3-501 to 3-511 combine ~·great many NIL 
sections into a unified presentation of ~11 rules concerning present-
ment, notice of dishonor, protest, and the rights based thereon. Few 
substantive rules are changed. In one significant change, UCC Section 
3-510 provides that if an instrument is not acce~ted within the re-
quired time after presentment, it is considered dishonored rather than 
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constructively accepted as under CRS 1953, 95-2-12. See UCC Section 
3-506. 
9. UCC Section 3-802 is new and provides that, unless other-
wise agreed, an instrument taken for an underlying obligation suspends 
the obligation until the instrument is due. Subsection (2), however, 
specifies that taking of a non-postdated check in good faith does not 
of itself extend the time on the original obligation so as to dis-
charge a surety. 
Upon adoption of Article 3 of the Code, Articles 1 through 4 
of Chapter 95 of the Colorado Revised Statutes, 1953, should be re-
pealed. 
ARTICLE 4 - BANK DEPOSITS and COLLECTIONS 
Article 4 of the uniform commercial code provides uniform 
rules to govern the collection by banks of checks and other instru-
ments for the payment of money, while preserving flexibility for the 
development of improved methods of collecting such items. The article 
also contains rules governing the relationship of banks with depositors 
in connection with the collection and payment of items. 
Uniform law in this area is a necessity: Individual Federal 
Reserve banks process as many as 1,000,000 items a day, and the larger 
banks in Denver in excess of 200,000 a day. Banks with le,s than 
$5,000,000 on deposit handle from 1,000 to 2,000 items daily. 
Bank collections in Colorado are now governed primarily by the 
provisions of CRS 14-18-1 et seq., enacted in 1957 and based largely 
upon the Bank Collection Code of the American Bankers Association 
(as well as the ABA' s i'Aodel Deferred Posting Statute). The Bank 
Collection Code has been vigorously attacked in other sections of the 
country on the ground that it was drafted with a view to protecting 
collecting banks from liability to the nonbanking public for any mis-
haps that might occur during the collection process and on the ground 
that its draftsmanship is "fifth rate." 
The provisions of Article 4 are intended to answer the criti-
cisms mentioned in the above paragraph. Other often-mentioned advan-
tages are: 
(1) Items in the process of bank collection today -- involving 
more than a billion transactions daily -- almost invariably cross state 
lines and a truly comprehensive and uniform act setting forth the basic 
rights of the parties concerned in any bank collection is badly needed; 
and 
(2) An opportunity is presented to codify into law a number of 
desirable collection practices and the results of beneficial case law, 
to prohibit or at least limit other collection practices deemed undesir-
able, and to reject less desirable case law. 
Article 4 does not fundament~lly change the rights and o~liga-
tions flowing from the provisions of CRS 14-18-1 et seq. A possible 
exception to this Section 4-403(2), which states that a customer's oral 
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stop payment order is bindiDg on a bank for 14 calendar days. Existing 
Colorado law does not allow such oral orders. The committee believes 
that provision recognizes a practice followed by a great many banks in 
Colorado; and that banks which do not care to honor such oral orders 
may vary the effect of this provision by an agreement to the contrary 
on signature cards or other contracts with its depositors. Such 
variation is allowed by Section 4-103(1) of the Code. 
ARTICLE 5 - LETTERS OF CREDIT 
Colorado has no statutory or case law relating to letters of 
credit. A letter of credit is defined in the code as a contract under 
which a bank or some other person undertakes, at the request of its 
customer, to honor drafts or other demands for payment for a period of 
time by the beneficiary named in the contract, upon presentation by 
that person of certain prescribed documents. The principal function 
of a letter of credit is to finance the movement of goods and assure 
the seller, who is normally the beneficiary of the credit, that he will 
be paid. This is done through the "documentary letter of credit. 
"(as distinguished from the "clean letter of credit"), by substituting 
the acceptable credit standing of a bank for the unknown or doubtful 
credit of the buyer who is the bank's customer. 
This device has been used primarily in connection with foreign 
imports. It is efficient and inexpensive and should be made available 
to buyers in Colorado of goods from foreign countries. But its advan-
tages may also be extended to domestic commerce. 
Article 5 does not involve any fundamental changes in the 
prior rules and standards which were adopted as the Uniform Customs 
and Practices for Commercial Documentary Credits by the International 
Chamber of Commerce. While recognized generally by banks in this 
country, the Uniform Customs and Practices were never adopted by 
treaty, or by federal or state statutes. The inclusion of the article 
in the uniform commercial code will give state statutory recognition to 
this financial device. 
ARTICLE 6 - BULK TRANSFERS 
The UCC covers any transfer in bulk, not in the ordinary course, 
of a major part of an enterprise whose principal business is the sale 
of merchandise from stock, including those who manufacture what they 
sell, with eight enumerated exceptions. Present Colorado law which was 
enacted in 1961 covers the transfer in bulk, not in the ordinary course, 
of any part, or the whole, stock in trade of any wholesale or retail 
merchandising business, with more limited exceptions. 
The provisions with respect to the listing of creditors and 
the description of the property to be transferred are substantially the 
same. Present Colorado law requires that a notice of the transfer be 
posted at least ten days before the transfer at the place of business 
where the stock in trade is located, and publication of the notice of 
transfer at least once in a newspaper of general circulation in the 
county at least five days prior to the transfer. Article 6 does not 
require any posting of the notice at the place of business, or 
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publication in any newspaper, but requires the transferee to preserve 
the list of creditors and the schedule of property in a designated 
place in the state of Colorado for six months, or to file the list 
and schedule in the office of the Secretary of State. Present Colorado 
law requires the transferee to send a copy of the notice of transfer to 
every creditor by certified or registered mail at least ten days before 
the transfer. The UCC requires the transferee at least ten days before 
he takes possession of the goods, or pays for them, whichever happens 
first, to give notice .to all creditors, stating that the bulk transfer 
is about to be made, the names and business addresses of the transferor 
and transferee, and whether or not all of the debts of the tiansferor 
are to be paid in full as they fall due as a result of the transaction, 
and, if so, the address to which the creditors should send their bills, 
but if the debts are not to be so paid, or if the transferee is in 
doubt on that point, then the notice must include the location and 
general description of the property and the estimated total of the 
transferor's debts, whether the transfer. is to pay existing debts, and, 
if so, the amount and to whom, or whether the transfer is for new con-
sideration, and, if so, the amount, and time and place of payment. 
Present Colorado law has no provision imposing any obligations 
upon auctioneers to give notice to creditors, but the UCC requires 
auctioneers to give notice at least ten days, either personally or by 
registered or certified mail. Failure of the autioneer to do so does 
not affect the validity of the sale, but if the autioneer knows that 
the auction constitutes a bulk transfer, the auctioneer is liable to 
the creditors of the transferor up to but not exceeding the net pro-
ceeds of the auction. 
Under present Colorado law, persons the transferor has reason 
to believe may become creditors prior to the date of transfer are en-
titled to notice, but under the UCC creditors who become such after the 
notice to creditors has been given are not entitled to notice. 
Under present Colorado law, the transfer can be adjourned to a 
time not more than 30 days subsequent to the original date, and the 
transferor can be found guilty of perjury if he makes a false affidavit. 
The UCC has no provision for adjournment of the transfer and imposes 
no criminal penalties. 
Civil liability for noncompliance under the two laws is substan-
tially the same, the Colorado law specifying that the transferee shall 
become a receiver and be held accountable to creditors for the stock in 
trade that came into his possession, and the UCC specifying that in the 
event of noncompliance the bulk transfer is ineffective as against 
creditors of the transferor. 
Under Colorado law, the remedy under the UCC would be by levy 
on the assets in the hands of the transferee, or perhaps by an action 
to set aside a fraudulent transfer, or equitable relief by way of 
injunction or receivership. A defective bulk transfer constitutes an 
act of bankruptcy, and creditors could unite to invoke the avoiding 
powers of the trustee under Section 70e of the Bankruptcy Act. 
After a bulk transfer has been consummated in accordance with 
the provisions of the UCC, creditor~ of the transferor have no rights 
against the assets of the transferee. Creditors are required to protect 
themselves before the transfer is consummated. 
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Present Colorado law provides a three-year statute of llmita-
tions, while under the UCC a six-month statute of limitations is 
provided. 
ARTICLE 7 - DOCUMENTS OF TITLE 
Article 7 of the uniform commercial code covers warehouse 
receipts, bills of lading, and other documents of title. If enacted 
into law in Colorado, this article would govern intrastate transac-
tions. The interstate transportation of goods will continue to be 
governed by the Federal Bills of Lading Act. In the process of 
developing Article 7, its provisions have in most instances been 
brought into line with the Federal Bills of Lading Act. 
Colorado adopted the Uniform Warehouse Rec~ipts Act in 1911, 
and in 1941 adopted the Uniform Sales Act which, in Sections 27-40, 
deals with the negotiable and non-negotiable documents of title. 
Colorado never adopted the Uniform Bills of Lading Act. It was, how-
ever, enacted in 31 other states. 
The report of the commission which studied the uniform com-
cercial code in Maryland described Article 7, in part, as follows: 
Article 7 makes no major policy changes but it 
does make a number of minor changes. In addition, 
it reorganizes and consolidates the statutory law 
relating to Documents of Title, expands its coverage 
beyond those of the older Acts, and clarifies and 
makes certain some ambiguous provisions in the older 
laws. **·* 
One policy change provides that a warehouse-
man is one engaged in storing goods for hire 
(7-101) and not one who is 11 lawfully 11 engaged in 
the business of storing, as is specified in present 
law. There is no reason why the unlawfulness of a 
warehousing enterprise should protect the warehouse-
man from the obligations of the documents he issues. 
Under present law, the holder of a negotiable 
receipt covering part of a mass of fungible goods, 
in the event of a sale of such goods by the ware-
houseman, can recover the goods if he can trace 
them. However~ the difficulty of tracing makes the 
rights of such receipt holder of little practical 
value. Section 7-205 clarifies the law by providing 
that a buyer in the ordinary course of business who 
takes delivery of fungible goods from a warehouseman 
who is in the business of buying and selling such 
goods takes free of any claim under the warehouse 
receipt. This resolves in favor of the good-faith 
buyer the ~onflict with the receipt holder who also 
acted in good faith but who made the sale possible by 
depositing with one in the business of selling. 
This provision is consonant with Section 2-403 on the 
power of one entrusted with goods who is in the 
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business of dealing in such goods of transferring 
title to a good-faith purchaser in the ordinary 
course of business. ***. 
Provision is made for termination of storage at 
the warehouseman's option at the end of a stated 
period and if none is specified on thirty days notice. 
If the goods are not removed, the warehouseman may 
sell them (7-206}. Present law does not contain a 
comparable provision. *** 
Article 7 clarifies a number of uncertain pro-
visions in our present law. The present uniform 
Warehouse Receipts Act and the Uniform·Bills of Lad-
ing Act both prohibit inclusion in a document of a 
provision impairing the obligation of the bailee to 
exercise due care. There is presently a conflict as 
to whether this injunction is violated by a stipula-
tion as to the value of the goods, particularly where 
the value is obviously understated. Within certain 
limits, the Code approves such stipulations in 
Sections 7-204 and 7-309, the justification being 
that a fully insured bailer should not be required 
to pay charges on full value. This permitted limi-
tation of liability does not apply to an appropriation 
of the goods to the bailee's own use. The Code 
provision is in accord with the Carmack Amendment to 
the Interstate Commerce Act applicable to bills of 
lading in inter-state shipments. ~* 
The issuer is liable for damages caused by 
over-issue or failure to identify conspicuously any 
duplicate document (7-402}. Present comparable law 
only applies in case of a negotiable document. 
Section 7-403 integrates into one Section what 
the old Acts covered with unnecessary and somewhat 
confusing duplication of effort in three Sections: 
one covering the obligation of the bailee to deliver, 
another covering justification for delivery, and 
still a third, liability for non-delivery.*** 
It is recommended that Article 7 be enacted in Colorado with 
the optional clauses of Section 7-204 and 7-403(l}(b) omitted; that 
Article 16 of Chapter 7, CRS 1953, relating to grain warehouses be 
repealed; and that Articles 1, 2, 3 and 5 of Chapter 146, CRS 1953, as 
well as Sections 27-40 inclusive, of the Uniform Sales Act be repealed. 
However, Article 4 of Chapter 146, which contains the criminal sanc-
tions relating to compliance with various provisions of the warehouse 
receipt laws, should be retained in appropriate changes in references 
to sections of the Colorado Revised Statutes, which are set forth 
therein. The committee finds no need for the repeal of Article 13 of 
Chapter 115 relating to unclaimed freight. 
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words: 
ARTICLE 8 - INVESTMENT SECURITIES 
An eminent authority desvribes Article 8 of the UCC in these 
'de are talking about conventional types of 
securities, stocks and bonds and debentures, the 
things we handle in ordinary, everyday corporate 
and banking practice. We are not talking about the 
more esoteric orange grove contracts in Florida or 
silver foxes on the hoof in California that are 
securities for regulatory purposes. 
What Article 8 does first is to make securi-
ties, as defined, negotiable instruments in the 
historical legal sense, so that the bona fide pur-
chaser of a security is invulnerable both to 
issuer's defenses and to adverse claims of owner-
ship or interest, legal or equitable by or through 
prior holders. 
As I see it, the major contributions Article 8 
has made in the whole area of the negotiability of 
securities are these: 
First, Article 8 distinguishes clearly between 
questions of the genuineness and effectiveness of 
the indorsement (power to indorse), and those in-
volving rightfulness of disposition (power to 
deliver if you will), of the indorsed instrument. 
Second, it substantially cuts down the cases in 
which a purchaser of a security, even one known to 
be in fiduciary ownership, is required to investi-
gate -- at the risk of his bona fide purchaser 
status; and 
Third, it clearly limits the cases in which an 
issuer is required to investigate before registering 
a transfer to two specific situations: 
1. Where an adverse claimant has filed a proper 
11 stop transfer" notice; or 
2. Where the issuer itself has demanded and re-
ceived "excess documentation" -- let us call it 
that for lack of a better term. 
--Carlos L. Israels, How to Handle 
Transfers of Stock. Bonds and Other In-
vestment Securities, 19 Bus. Law 91 
(1963). 
Relatively little law, either statutory or by court decision, 
exists which applies to the billions of dollars per year of transac-
tions to which Article 8 would apply. The Uniform Stock Transfer Act, 
CRS 31-9-1 et. seq., adopted in Colorado in 1927, would be superceded 
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by Article 8 and covers onlw a few of the matters which Article 8 
would cover. 
To a large extent, existing law and commercial practice have 
been followed in the drafting of this article. However, a conscious 
attempt has been made to cha:lllige the law of those cases holding an 
issuer or purchaser liable fo-r the wrongful disposition of the proceeds 
of a sale of stock, for example, stock sold by a trustee and applied 
to his personal benefit. 
This problem has beem met, in the case of fiduciaries, by the 
adoption of the Uniform Act for the Simplification of Fiduciary 
Security Transfers, CRS 57-6-1 et. seq., adopted in Colorado in 1959. 
Article 8 applies the principles of the simplification act to all 
transfers, and in fact penalizes the issuer for requiring excessive 
documentation. 
The 1962 version of the UCC takes in account the changes made 
by New York at the insistence of the stock exchanges, banks, and 
transfer agents located there. Very few changes have been made in 
other states. 
No instance has been found where existing Colorado law would 
be changed, other than in repeal of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act and 
changes in two principles contained therein: 
1. CRS 31-9-1 makes delivery and indorsement 
necessary to effect a change of ownership 
of stock. UCC Section 8-307 makes only 
(voluntary) delivery of the security neces-
sary to effect change of ownership with the 
transferor being compelled to supply any 
necessary indorsements. 
2. CRS 31-9-16 permits a court to order is-
suance of a replacement certificate. UCC 
Section 8-405 makes issuance o.f a replace-
ment certificate mandatory when the re-
quirements of the section are met, without 
court order. 
It is recommended: 
1. That Article 8 be adopted unchanged. 
2. That Article 1, Chapter 39, CRS 1953 
be repealed. 
3. That Article 6, Chapter 57, CRS 1953 
be retained by specific reference 
10-104(2) of the UCC. 
ARTICLE 9 - SECURED TRANSACTIONS 
Very little of the substance of existing Colorado security law 
would be changed by the adoption of Article 9. One does not arrive at 
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this conclusion quickly or easily, however, from the casual reading of 
the text of the uniform commercial code. Indeed, the conclusion can 
only be reached in about four steps (or jolts) and not without some 
mental turmoil. 
The first step is the recognition that the code provides in 
one article an entire system that is to govern all security transac-
tions, abolishing old language of pledge, of chattel mortgage, of 
trust receipts, of conditional sales, and even of such hybrid devices 
for security as the sale and lease-back or the consignment of goods. 
The scope of the article is readily found in the definition of 
security interests in Section 1-201(37) and in the policy statement 
of Section 9-102. 
So broad and inclusive an application of one code system re-
quires new language that is both precise and distinct from the conno-
tations of the mortgage, pledge and trust receipt. The second step 
comes with the realization of the importance of code definitions. At 
least thirty-two are contained or adopted in Article 9 and another 
forty-four set out in Article 1 as applicable. The impact of so many 
definitions upon the student or the practicing lawyer is heavy. The 
definitions in Article 1 and in Part I of Article 9 can only be 
assimilated after study and familiarity, and here lies a basic problem 
in understanding the intricate relationship of the fifty-three sections 
of the Article. Each of the seventy-six definitions is carefully 
stated, is used without confusion, and of course cannot be changed 
without loss of value in the article as a system of codified law.· 
Next, after recognizing the importance of the precise defini-
tions of the article, the student realizes that the article uses the 
definitions to distinguish carefully the business or economic function 
of 9ifferent types of security in different relationships. Thus, the 
sale of personal property is excluded from coverage in Article 9 but 
the sale of intangible rights is so closely allied to their transfer 
as security that the article does cover sales of accounts or contract 
rights or chattel paper. Again, the protection of,purchase money 
security interests in household furniture is quite a different problem 
from the protection of purchase money security interests in fixtures 
and the necessity for filing a security agreement in the latter case 
is clear, but in the former case is largely unnecessary as shown by 
the fact that many chattel mortgages on household goods are today not 
filed by the most sophisticated lenders. It is the discovery of a 
multitude of rules affecting different classes of property, all within 
Article 9, that has the most frightening impact upon the new student. 
The fourth and final step lies in the discovery that the 
myriad situations that are thus carefully defined and treated give a 
result which is either the same or entirely compatible with Colorado 
statutes or decisions. The reason that Article 9 makes little change 
in the substance of law is not true in many states; it is true in 
Colorado for two reasons. In the first place, Article 9 is not intended 
to make a change in public policy. Thus, the retail installment sales 
acts, usury laws, and small loan laws are not affected and many vary 
from state to state. The second reason why the changes in Colorado· 
law are minimal is because we have been favored by enlightened, flex-
ible, and workable security laws which are in large part themselves 
incorporated into the fundamental principles of the uniform commercial 
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code. Colorado is already familiar with the concept of the floating 
lien on inventory~ the use of intangibles as security under the Act 
for Assignment of Accounts Receivable; and even in the early days, 
Colorado adopted a definition of a "chattel mortgage" to embrace a 
variety of devices intended to operate to give security. Not all 
states have been so fortunate. 
It should not be concluded that because Colorado is favorably 
positioned with respect to its existing security laws, that Article 9 
is unnecessary. Rather, we are fortunate that the adoption of Article 
9 can be so easily affected without fundamental changes in our sub-
stantive law. The advantages of adopting Article 9 in place of the 
present conglomeration of statutes include the following: 
1. The adoption of a single system makes possible the assem-
bling of a variety of security laws in the one article with a reason-
able assurance of consistent application. Moreover, the code goes 
beyond our present law to provide a framework for the economic use 
for security purposes of intangible interests which are only now com-
ing to be recognized as important property interests in our economic 
system. 
2. Secondly, the code does away firmly, once and for all, with 
confusion resulting from doctrines concerning title as applied to 
security transactions. The question of title may be retained in pro-
perty transactions, taxation, or elsewhere as a valid concept, but in 
security law the rights of the debtor or secured party are to be 
determined without ancient or technical concepts of title to cloud the 
results. 
3. In the third place, Colorado will benefit from a code which 
is fundamentally the same both here and in neighboring states. Al-
ready twenty-nine states have adopted the code and undoubtedly within 
the next few years the code will be as pervasive a feature of law as 
the first negotiable instrument law. Colorado has not needed to be in 
the vanguard with respect to the uniform commercial code, but neither 
should we close our eyes to the advantage of uniformity in commercial 
and security transactions between ourselves and other states if we 
aspire to a position of importance in commerce and banking as a distri-
bution center. Kansas alone of our near neighbors remains aloof from 
the code. 
4. A fourth advantage to Article 9 lies in the fact that 
definite answers are given in areas which have not in all cases been 
the subject of court decision or specific statute. The negotiable 
instruments law was a blessing in providing a codification of commer-
cial law in an area in which uniformity was important. Article 9 is a 
more complete system than our 1)rior statutes and decisions, and lawyers 
will have less difficulty in finding specific answers within its 
corners than was true previously. 
5. Finally, a distinct advantage lies in the simple and 
clear-cut provisions for foreclosure. Again, the practice is not 
greatly different from that which we have commonly known. In Mr. 
Hellerstein's book on chattel mortgages, he has heretofore cautioned 
of the advisability that foreclosures be handled through court pro-
ceedings where substantial amounts are involved, and probably many 
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many attorneys have shared concern in the handling of foreclosure 
sales without benefit of statute and with little certainty as to the 
sufficiency of publication or th~ presumption of finality to be at-
tached to the sale's price. This uncertainty is gone and at the same 
time rules in Article 9 provide for the protection of all possible 
interests while permitting self-help procedures. 
To illustrate or explain item-by-item the advantages of Article 
9 would duplicate at length the article itself. The advantages of its 
adoption are compelling. The only reluctance is the necessity of 
learning new definitions and of mastering a new statutory framework. 
Time will resolve this problem and the advantages of the code will 
favor the state's economy, doubtless for generations to come. 
ARTICLE 10 - EFFECTIVE DATE AND REPEALER 
The tenth and final article of the code contains sections fix-
ing the effective date, the repeal of specific statutes such as those 
listed on page ·11 above, a general repealer section, and a specific 
mention of some laws which are not intended to be repealed, such as 
the Uniform Act for the Simplification of Fiduciary Security Transfers. 
States which have already adopted the uniform commercial code 
have fixed effective dates which generally were from one to two years 
after the time of adoption. If the Colorado General Assembly adopts 
the code in 1965, the effective date should be sufficiently in the 
future to permit the entire commercial and legal community to learn its 
provisions, modify their business and legal forms, and be prepared for 
the changes which will occur. 
Since the uniform commercial code will be a civil law, the 
criminal penalties relating to compliance with various provisions of 
the warehouse receipts laws, chattel mortgage laws, and other laws 
will be presented in a companion bill. 
Provisions relating to fees to be charged for filing various 
instruments as required under the provisions of the code will likewise 
be presented in a companion bill. 
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APPENDIX C 
REASONS FOR THE CODE 
(Adapted by Colorado Bar Association Committee on 
Uniform Commercial Code from Similar Report 
Prepared for State of Illinois) 
There are three basic reasons why the uniform commercial code 
should be enacted in Colorado. 
The first is that in some areas of commercial law Colorado 
is virtually "lawless.'' The rules governing these increasingly im-
portant areas are neither settled nor known. In addition, many other 
areas of commercial law have no decisional or statutory base. No 
commercially important state can afford so much uncertainty as to 
applicable law. 
The second basic reason is that the original uniform acts which 
govern much of Colorado commercial law were promulgated prior to 1910 
and reflect the technology and commercial practices of the nineteenth 
century. Some of the original uniform acts are inconsistent in policy 
with others. The code modernizes and simplifies the law, particularly 
with respect to secured transactions, in the light of current com-
mercial need and makes consistent the policies underlying commercial 
law. 
Finally, today there is no uniformity among the states excPot 
among the 30 jurisdictions that have already adopted the code. The 
only hope of national uniformity lies in the code. With an ever nar-
rowing world and an ever increasing interstate and international 
business, national uniformity of commercial law is essential. The 
code, moreover, contains many rules of conflict of laws which simplify 
and make certain for enacting jurisdictions the rules of law which are 
to be applied in particular interstate and international transactions. 
The elimination of uncertainty as to commercial law, its modern-
ization and simplification and the making of commercial law uniform 
throughout the nation necessarily expedites and lowers the legal cost 
of doing business. The code does all of these and should, therefore, 
be enacted in Colorado 
The code represents the first concerted and avowed effort to 
make the commercial law uniform not only among the several states but 
internally as well. Solutions of comparable problems in the separate 
articles were brought together for comparison; they had to conform 
unless differences could be justified functionally. 
The older uniform acts in the commercial field have made great 
contributions. However, four of those acts are more than fifty to 
sixty years of age. Certainly the time for their re-examination has 
come and the code is the result of that re-examination. Perhaps no one 
who has worked upon it is completely happy with every provision. In 
many parts it is necessarily a compr~mise. 
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For these reasons and others more fully set forth in our analy-
sis of the separate articles the code provides a system of commercial 
law better suited to our times and much superior to that provided by 
existing multifarious statutes and uncertain common law. We believe 
we should claim these advantages for today instead of seeking forever 
a theoretical perfection unlikely to be achieved. 
Scope of the Code 
The code covers practically all of the commercial law: sales 
of personal property, commercial paper (notes, checks, drafts), bank 
collections and the relationship of bank with customer, letters of 
credit, bulk sales, documents of title (bills of lading, warehouse 
receipts, air bills and the like), investment securities (share 
certificates, debentures, bearer and registered bonds and other in-
vestment paper), the entire field of security in personal property 
(now known as pledges, chattel mortgages, conditional sale contracts, 
trust receipts, factor's lien, assignment of accounts receivable). In 
large degree the code preserves and continues the law as it is today, 
both common law and statutory, but it also makes changes in substance 
in each of the many areas it covers. It clarifies the law where it is 
now uncertain, and it provides answers with respect to matters of com-
mercial law not now readily found. Each of the nine articles except 
Article 5, Letters of Credit, replaces one or more Colorado statutes, 
including some of the uniform acts in the commercial field. 
How the ~ode Affects Particular Groups of 
Jndividuals and Business 
The uniform commercial code is not, of course, "all things to 
all men.'' Nevertheless, its advantages reach all people with legiti-
mate interests who have contacts with the commercial law. It not only 
seeks uniformity among the several states by widespread adoption, but 
it achieves a uniformity within the state among all branches of the 
commercial law, a uniformity not consciously sought in the past nor 
completely achieved. The code simplifies and clarifies the law and 
provides a host of answers which cannot be found with certainty today. 
It is not revolutionary but on the other hand it modernizes the 
law in the light of the experience of over half a century of unprece-
dented commercial growth since several of our major acts were promul-
gated. 
The code was not prepared by or for any group or class. In 
fact, it is probable that never before in the history of legislation 
have so many able people worked so long in so earnest an effort to seek 
out every legitimate interest and need, to reconcile every conflict of 
view and to draft an act which will meet these needs satisfactorily and 
at the same time have a fair prospect of widespread adoption. 
Neither is the code a collection of "special privileges." 
However, in addition to the general advantages of clarity and certainty 
which accrue to all, there are some provisions of particular interest 
to certain groups and these we shall endeavor to illustrate, but not 
to exhaust. These are: The Consumer; The Man with a Bank Account; 
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The Manufacturer; The Distributor; The Retailer; The Farmer; The 
Insurance Company; The Security Dealer, Investment Broker and Issuing 
Corporation; and The Credit Manager. 
The Consumer 
Almost all persons, natural or artificial, are consumers. 
The group includes the bank president, the very apotheosis of business 
acumen, and the unskilled worker who is generally not well versed in 
business matters. Almost all consumers have contact with the com-
mercial law with respect to sales. Many will continue under the code, 
as they do today, almost unaware of the law of sales. However, if they 
seek guidance in advance of action they will find in the tode a scheme 
of things worked out more completely and presented with greater clarity 
than in the law today. They are more likely to find a solution to 
their problem arrived at with due respect for fair play for all parties 
then under present law. 
The code frowns upon the unconscionable contract. There is, of 
course, nothing necessarily unconscionable about selling an article 
without warranty of any kind but there is if the buyer is not made 
aware of the fact that the transaction is upon that basis. The code re-
quires that any disclaimer of warranty be made much clearer than does 
the present law. 
The code makes it clear that the warranty runs both to members 
of the family and to the guest aAd as proposed in Colorado to any 
person who may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be effected by 
the goods. If the dinner guest is the one who bites on the concealed 
tack in the bread or the ground glass in the jar of baked beans it 
should be a comfort to both host and guest that the latter has the 
benefit of the immediate seller's warranty and is not remitted to un-
certain recourse against the manufacturer in a difficult negligence 
action. 
If a buyer makes known his needs and relies upon the seller's 
skill and judgment to supply an article to meet them, there is an 
implied warranty that the article is suitable for the purpose. Unfor-
tunately, under present law there is a provision which seems to invite 
the seller's defense that there is no warranty if the purchaser requests 
an article bearing a "patent or trade name." The code omits this un-
fortunate suggestion. 
The consumer will profit by the simplification of the process 
by which he can give security in the personal property he buys and by 
the clear spelling out of his rights and duties on default. Under 
present law, because of conflicting and unnecessary complications in 
the formalities required to make the security good against third parties, 
the secured party too often loses his security by an inadvertent slip 
which it is humanly impossible always to avoid. The buyer's levying 
creditor may gain a windfall, or a purchaser to whom the buyer wrongfully 
has resold may take free of the security interest although the means to 
discover it were at hand, but the debtor himself does not profit by the 
secured party's loss for he remains liable in any case. Moreover, 
debtors as a class must pay the increased cost of such financing. The 
code not only reduces the formalities to a minimum but it provides that 
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even in case of a slip the creditor and purchaser with actual know-
ledge of the security interest cannot take advantage of the slip, as 
under some circumstances they can under the law of Colorado today. 
The Man with the Bank Account 
All who use checks, either by issuing them or rece1v1ng them, 
will profit by the greater certainty under the code of the rules under 
which the check moves from bank to bank in the collection process. 
The right of the drawer of a check to stop payment is recog-
nized under present law but in some states the banks have exacted 
from their customers a promise not to hold the bank liable if it over-
looks the stop order. The code makes such an agreement invalid as a 
matter of public policy whether supported, by consideration or not. 
At the same time, in fairness to the bank which overlooks the stop 
order, it subrogates the bank to the rights of the person it has paid; 
this will often avoid an unjust enrichment of the drawer at the bank's 
expense. 
The Manufacturer 
The manufacturer gains substantially from the improved law of 
sales, both with respect to his purchases of raw materials and wi~h 
respect to his sales of finished products. Our present sales act, now 
half a century old, was framed more in terms of the single sale. In 
contrast, the _code visualizes a continuous flow of goods in commerce. 
If a manufacturer learns before the date for delivery that his 
supplier, in breach of contract, will not deliver at the appointed 
time, he may contract with others for his supply. This he may do under 
present law and under the code. However, there is a difference: under 
present law the damages he will recover for the breach will be deter-
mined by the market price at the time set for delivery whereas, under· 
the code, it is the cost of "cover" at the time he contracted for it 
which is to govern. Under present law his purchase of "cover" is 
somewhat a gamble. Under the code the wisdom of his action is weighed 
as of the time he acted. 
The code provides a simple system for giving security in in-
ventory with formalities reduced to a minimum. It allows the manu-
facturer to give a general security interest in his shifting stock of 
inventory presently owned or after-acquired. On the other hand, it 
does not prevent someone else from obtaining a first lien on goods he 
has financed, though the party with the general lien is entitled to 
notice of the purchase money security interest. As a matter of fact, 
a particular advantage of the code for all. concerned inheres in its 
specific provisions dealing with .the relat'ive priority of liens of 
variou~ kinds and with the extent of validity of liens obtained in 
other states on property subsequently brought into a code state. 
The manufacturer benefits also because, if need be, he can 
obtain reliable security in his product in the event he finances pur-
chases by his wholesale and retail distributors. 
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The Distributor 
Like the manufacturer, the distributor benefits from the mod-
ernization of the law both as one who gives and as one who takes 
security. Both distributor and manufacturer, if they market their 
products and wares in more than one state, will gain from the uniform-
ity which will result from wide adoption of the code. Today, there is 
less uniformity with respect to security than in any other field of 
the law. Consider for example a company which manufacturers farm im-
plements and distributes them in every state. It has found that 
compliance with the varying requirements of the 50 states with respect 
to chattel mortgages, conditional sales, trust receipts, factor's 
liens and other security devices poses a riddle which is almost in-
soluble. As a result, companies in that position are most enthusiastic 
supporters of the code. 
The Retailer 
The retailer, like all who buy or sell goods, will gain from 
the improved law of sales. Of the 111 sections in Article 2, Sales, 
37 have no prior statutory counterpart. The code, therefore, answers, 
roughly, 50 percent more questions than our present sales act and it 
does so in the light of over a half century of experience under the 
older act. 
Like the manufacturer and the distributor, the retailer profits 
from a system, effective and simple, by which in a single device he 
may give security in inventory and equipment, presently owned and after-
acquired. If goods he has sold are returned to him, the security in-
terest can reattach without question. · 
The security interest may cover the proceeds of his sales, 
whether simple book accounts for unsecured sales or a reserved security 
interest in what he has sold. If he then sells the reserved security 
interest and the debt it secures (called by the code "chattel paper"} 
the code provides a clear system of priorities between the secured 
party with an interest in "proceeds" and the purchaser of the 11 chattel 
paper." Many of these questions cannot be solved with assurance under 
present law. 
The Farmer 
The farmer, also, is continuously engaged in commerce, as a 
buyer and seller of goods and a borrower of money. Thus he, too, has 
an interest in the clarification and improvement of the law of sales, 
bank deposits and collections and security devices. Moreover, he will 
benefit particularly from provisions of the code which liberalize and 
simplify security interests in farm equipment, feed, livestock and 
crops and these security documents continue to be filed locally at his 
own county seat, convenient to him. Like other borrowers who give 
security to obtain a loan, he will find increased protection under the 
code. 
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The Insurance Company 
The code does not deal with insurance companies as such and 
they benefit only as others do who come into contact with the com-
mercial law. Insurance companies hold vast quantities of investment 
securities and the stock companies are issuers of stock certificates. 
In both capacities they benefit from a modernized system of handling 
transfers of security paper, as indicated briefly in the next section. 
Insurance companies issue and receive checks and drafts in enormous 
quantities and will derive benefit from an improved and better regu-
lated bank collection system. 
Security Dealer, Investment Broker 
and Issuing Corporation 
Article 8 provides a modernized and improved system of handling 
all transfers of investment securities. The bearer bond has not been 
confortable within the confines of the negotiable instruments law. 
The stock transfer act governs transfers of stock certificates only. 
The registered bond and other registered securities have been left 
pretty much without statutory guidance. Because all of these are 
similar with respect to transfer problems they are gathered together 
in Article 8. For the first time there is a comprehensive treatment 
of the whole transfer problem. All who handle investment paper should 
benefit materially from increased certainty and simplicity. 
The Credit Manager 
In addition to many of the things already mentioned under 
other headings, there are other improvements in the code which will be 
recognized by credit managers of business concerns. For instance, 
pitfalls in the inception of a sales transaction are removed by simpli-
fication of the requirement of a memorandum satisfying the statute of 
frauds, recognition of an offer binding for a reasonable period without 
special consideration, provisions regarding the effect of confirmations 
between merchants, provisions authorizing and describing the effect of 
open price terms, and other innovations in the law tailored to reason-
able business practices and expectations. A seller is given limited 
protection in the event of insolvency of the buyer shortly after 
delivery of the goods and before they have been paid for, and a buyer 
is given similar protection in the event of insolvency of a seller 
occurring shortly after receipt of advances but before delivery of the 
goods. 
General creditors will benefit from the requirement of a more 
adequate notice in advance of bulk sales; and the concealed ownership 
of goods held on consignment for sale, as well as the secret lien of 
an assignee of accounts receivable, will be outlawed by the requirement 
of public filing. On the other hand, the notice type of filing autho-
rized by the code will be far simpler and less expensive than is the 
recordation of chattel mortgages today. Realization on security in the 
event of default will be standardized and simplified and better suited 
to the protection of the interests of.all parties. 
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APPENDIX D 
The Corporation, Banking and Business Law Section of the 
Colorado Bar Association is governed by a council, the officers and 
members of which are: 
Harl G. Douglass 
Julius Friedrich 
David J. Clarke 












Robert W. Bartley 
Louis A. Hellerstein 
Robert F. Welborn 






The Corporation Section, during the fall of 1963, created a 
Committee on the Uniform Commercial Code. Approximately 60 members 
of the section were appointed to that committee. 
The Uniform Commercial Code Committee has had an executive 
committee and three subcommittees. The officers and members of the 
executive committee and the chairmen of the subcommittees who worked 
on each of the several articles of the Code are: 
David J. Clarke, Chairman 
Charles A. Baer, Vice Chairman 
Thomas J. Kerwin, Secretary 
H. Harold Calkins, Subcommittee Chairman on 
Articles 2, 6 and 7 
Charles H. Haines, Jr., Subcommittee Chairman 
on Article 9 
Lester R. Woodward, Subcommittee Chairman 
on Articles 3, 4, 5 and 8 
Bruce Buell, Chairman of the Section's 
Committee on Banking 
Louis A. Hellerstein, Chairman of the Section's 
Committee on Secured Transactions 
Alec J. Keller, Chairman of the Section's Committee 
on Securities 
The members of the subcommittees who made the initial analyses 
of the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code (and without whose 
efforts the task would never have been accomplished) were:* 
ARTICLE 2 - SALES 
H. Harold Calkins, Chairman 
Robert S. Gast, Jr. 
Gilbert L. Mcswain 
Hugh J. McClearn 
Edward A. \falsh 
James C. Seccombe, Jr. 
Gail E. Oppenner 
George B. Brennan 
John C. Corbridge 
Clayton Knowles 
* Articles 1 and 10 were handled by the Executive Committee 
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ARTICLE 3 - COMMERCIAL PAPER 
Lester R. Woodward, Chairman 
Don Sears 
Ira E. Tanner 
John W. Low 
William P. Waggener 
Ben D. Sublett 
Robert Yegge 
ARTICLES 4 and 5 - BANK DEPOSITS AND 
COLLECTIONS and LETTERS OF CREDIT 
Lester R. Woodward, Chairman 
Don Sears 
James C. Owen, Jr. 
John S. Potter 
William R. Kelley 
George Gibson 
J. Peter Lindsay 
Fred Pattridge 
ARTICLES 6 and 7 - BULK TRANSFERS and 
WAREHOUSE RECEIPTS, BILLS OF LADING, etc. 
H. Harold Calkins, Chairman 
Elmer P. Cogburn 
Bradford Wells 
Jack B. Toll 
ARTICLE 8 - INVE.:5TMENT SECURITIES 
Lester R. Woodward, Chairman 
Charles E. Henry 
Sanford Hertz 
Ernest Lohf 
ARTICLE 9 - SECURED TRANSACTIONS 
Charles H. Haines, Jr., Chairman 
Stephen A. Hellerstein, Secretary 
R. Dale Tooley, Chairman, Part 2 
Robert D. Charlton, Chairman, Part 3 
Willis Carpenter, Chairman, Part 4 
Douglas R. State, Chairman, Part 5 
Edward M. Sears 
Arthur J. Seifert 
Wm. Hedges Robinson, Jr. 
J. Albert Sebald 
Robert G. Wilson 
Keith Anderson 
James Robb 
Paul DeF. Hicks, Jr. 
Michael Vaggalis 
Robert J. Shanstrom 
D. Monte Paseo 
Richard Wohlgenant 
Stanton D. Rosenbaum 
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APPENDIX E 
VlHY THE COMMERCIAL CODE SHOULD BE "UNIFORM" 
By William A. Schnader 
(Reprinted by Permission of the Author and 
the Washington and Lee Law Review) 
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Subsection (2) of section 1-101 of the Uniform Commercial Code 
statealhat: 
· · .. (2) Underlying purposes and policies of this Act are 
"(a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing 
commercial transactions; 
"(b) to permit the continued expansion of commercial prac-
tices through custom, usage and agreement of th~ parties; 
.. (c) to make uniform the law among the various jurisdic-
tions." 
Business men, lawyers, legislators and legislative draftsmen have 
no difficulty in understanding the purposes and policies of the Code as 
stated in clauses (a) and (b). 
Everybody can understand why the law governing commercial 
transactions should be simplified, clarified and modernized, and why 
there should be continued expansion of commercial practices in this 
country through custom, usage and agreement of the parties. 
Therefore, one would think that if the hundreds of thousands of 
hours of time and the hundreds of thousands of dollars of money 
which went into the drafting of the Uniform Commercial Code had 
produced a "model" Commercial Code, to serve as the base for any 
state desiring to improve its statutory law governing commercial trans-
actions, the states would have enacted it immediately. 
The truth is that the busy judges, law professors and practicing 
lawyers who contributed the hundreds of thousands of hours, and the 
foundations and business concerns that contributed the hundreds of. 
thousands of dollars, would never have contributed their time or their 
money for the preparation of a "model" Commercial Code. 
Viewed from this standpoint, the most important of the underlying 
purposes and policies of the "Uniform" Commercial Code is the last, 
namely, "to make uniform the law among th~ various jurisdictions." 
•Partner, Schnader, Harrison, Segal &: Lewis, Philadelphia, Pa.; Chairman, Per• 
manent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code, American Law Institute, 
Philadelphia, Pa. A.B. 1go8, U.D. 1931, Franklin and Manhall College; LLB. 191a, 
. aoh. lJpiverllity of Pelllll}'lftllia; J..l.,I>, 19511~ Temple Uniftllitv. 
158 WASHINGTON AND LEE UW REYIEW [VoLXX 
Here, too; we get general agreement among businessmen and law-
yen that theoretically the law governing a>mmercial transactions 
should be uniform among every American jurisdiction. 
In this country there are only two possible methods of obtaining 
complete uniformity of the statutory law on any subject. One .method 
is the enactment of a law by Congress. The other method is by adop-
tion of the same statute by fifty states and the District of Columbia. 
The difficulty with the first method, when we are considering the 
regulation of commercial transactions, is that Congress does not have 
complete power to deal with such transactions. It may deal with them 
only if they are in or affect interstate commerce. All of us know that 
the United States Supreme Court has found it possible to say that 
almost every commercial transaction "affects" interstate coounerce, but 
even so there is a segment of these transactions which could not be said 
to have the slightest effect upon commerce between the states. Thus, 
to give Congress power to enact a statute like the Uniform Commer-
cial Code which would be universally applicable throughout Ameri-
can jurisdictions, a constitutional amendment expanding the power 
of Congress to regulate commerce would be necessary. 
If our state laws regulating commercial transactions are not made 
uniform in substantially all respects within the next few years, it is not 
unlikely that a movement may be initiated to have the necessary consti-
tutional amendment proposed and adopted. 
More than seventy years ago, in 1892, the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws was organized because it was 
felt that there were certain areas of statutory law which needed to 
be uniform throughout the United States, and because it was felt that 
legislative power should not be further concentrated in the hands of 
the federal Congress. One of the subjects upon which there was general 
agreement that there should be uniformity was the law of commercial 
transactions. Therefore, it is not surprising that in the very first year of 
its existence the Conference promulgated an act on notes, checks, 
drafts and bills of exchange, and in 1896 it promulgated the Negoti-
able Instruments Law, a much more pretentious act dealing with 
commercial paper. 
Promulgated in 19o6 w~ the Uniform Sales Act and the Uniform 
Warehouse Receipts Act, in 1909 the Uniform Bills of Lading Act 
and the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, and still later, the Uniform 
Conditional Sales Act and the Uniform Trust Receipts Act. 
Of these seven important acts regulating commercial transactions, 
only three have been enacted by every American jurisdiction. these be-
in2 the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, the Uniform Warehouse 
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R~.Act and the Uniform Stock Transfer Act. However, it re-
quir•-twenty-eight yean to have the N.I.L. enacted by all the states, 
Jiftee-.,yeaQ to accomplish the same result with the Uniform Ware-
hou•Receipts Act and forty-seven years to have ·the Uniform Stock 
Transfer Act adopted in every jurisdiction. 
The-Uniform Sa.les Act was promulgated in 1906, but after almost 
sixty .Jan it has not as yet been universally enacted by the states, 
eithcr.-parately or in modified form as Article 2 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code. 
On the surface it might seem that to have the law relating to ne-
gotiable. instruments uniform throughout the United States after 
twenty-eight yean was a notable achievement. That might be so ex-
cept for two facts. One fact js that non-uniform amendmcnu were 
made by this state and that state, without consultation with or die 
approval or consent of the other states which had the N J.L. on theit 
statute books. The other fact is that in 1940, by actual count. 8o of the 
1g8 sections of the N.1.L. had different meanings in different jurisdic-
tions because their highest courts had construed them differently. 
There is no kno1"n way in which the Supmne Courts of our Ameri-
can states can be induced. in construing a statutory provision, to follow -
the decisions of the highest courts of other states construing the same 
provision.· Thus, it is incumbent upon the draftsmen of unifDrm acts 
to exert more than ordinary efforts to use clear and unambiguous lan-
guage. That is the surest way to avoid divergent interpretations of the 
same language by different couns. However, in the drafting of the 
Uniform Commercial Code another step was taken. to avoid this un-
desirable result. Careful comments were made explaining the history 
and purpose of each section. These comments are "official" because 
they were prepared, reviewed and adopted by the same persons who 
prepared, reviewed and adopted the text of a,he Code. 
It was very laigely because of the existing non-uniformity of the 
Negotia:ble lnstn1rnents Law as it had been modified either by legisla-
tive ameridments or .. judicial legislation" that in 1940, the proposal 
was made · that · a Unifomi Commercial Code be prepared and pro-
mulgated in an effwt to make the law regulating commercial trans-
actions really uniform- throughout the states. 
Also, there were conflicting provisions in the Uniform Sales Act, 
the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act and the Uniform Bills of Lad-
ing Act. Such a situation was undesirable and required attention. 
Thus it was that in the fall of 1940, when the National Conference 
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of Commissionen on Uniform State Laws met in Philadelphia, the 
writer, who was then its President, said: 1 
"Our splendid commercial acts were prepared and adopted 
by this Conference many years ago. Many changes in methods 
of transacting business have taken place in the meanwhile. 
"In addition, they were adopted and recommended piece-
meal. In a number of respects, there is overlapping and duplica-
tion, and in some instances, inconsistency, in dealing with 
negotiable instrUments, bills of lading, warehouse receipts, stock 
tramfers, sales.and trust receipts. 
"'Could not a great uniform commercial code be prepared, 
whp. ~ bring the. commercial law up to da.te, and which 
~ tht u.aiform law of our fifty-three jurisdictions. 
· by ·'tm'a of only 6fty-thrcc acts, ~tead of many times 
that .... . 
Tbe-~~~ .. Omference· amwered the question in the affirmative 
but it ~ ~t dae project was· too great for it alone to handle. 
F~tely/ it was able to ~ the cooperation of The An:terican 
Law lmtitute. _J'11nds were mbacribed and the work was undertaken 
and~ as the major project of both organizations during a 
· period of q~y SC\'ell yan. . 
The/Code 1QS &nally proniulgated at a joint meeting of both 
~ in-~ YortCity in September, 1951. Its first enact-
ment .-.. by .tbir ~ffffla LegislatW~\µI April, 1953, and to date, 
May 1, •.'6s ..• it_~ . .·..... beefi.• .. efla4ffl b·.y twcnt~. · · additional states.3 
. Wheatbe Umfonn Laws Annotated edition of the Code came out 
ill ~· 1962, Ollly eighteen states had enacted the Code, and thus 
it wu impossible in that edition to call a.ttentiQn ~ the wriations in 
the text of .~ which have been made by. the~6vc states which 
have thus far~ it this year. - ' · 
To show the lack of undcntanding of legislators and legislative 
draftsmen -of the imp>rtance of uniformity in a monumental Code 
iaccnded to regula~ all commercial transactiom in the United States, 
wej~all calt specific attention to the .v,ariatious made in the eighteen 
,'.·" •• : < __ ,. • • • • ' -
11940 llandboo'k. -Of the Natjonal c.mfereaa: of CommissioQua on Uniform 
Slate Laws, s8 (1940). 
'The .55 ju~ Jndude the District of Columbia, Alub, Hawaii, the 
Philippmes and.Puerto llko. Granting of independence to tbe Philippines awuced 
· the number to 51. 
"For a·fuller history of the preparation of the code see the edition of the Code 
published by Edward Thompson Company of Brooklyn, New York, as a pan of Uoi• 
form Laws Annotcd, at pages LXIII and LXXI. AU ciiatiom of the Code hereafter 
will be to that work which, according to the publisher, is to be cited as Uniform 
Commercial Code (ULA), but which we shall cite as UCC, ULA. 
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states that had enacted the Code prior to January 1, 1963, in Article 
son Commercial Paper, which largely tales the place of the N.I.L. 
This will demonstrate more vividly than could be demonstrated 
in any other way the difficulty of obtaining complete statutory uni-
formity in the law regulating commercial transactions in this country, 
. as long as the states are permitted to deal with this area of the law, 
unless a different attitude can be instilled into our legislators and 
into our state legislative draftsmen. 
Parenthetically, let me state that the question which this article 
is intended to answer has not been overlooked. It will be answered 
later. 
As promulgated by The American Law Institute and the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Article s of 
the Code contains 79 sections. As indicated in I UCC, ULA, pages 
359-568 only 58 of -the 79 sections were uniformly adopted in the 
eighteen states. Incidentally, the reader should have in mind the 
states about which we are speaking. They are, in the order in which 
they enacted the Code, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Kentucky, Con-
necticut, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Wyoming, Arkansas. New 
Mexico, Ohio, Orgeon, Oklahoma, Illinois, New Jersey, Georgia, 
Alaska, New York and Michigan. Included in these states are, with 
several notable exceptions, the most important states in the Union as 
far as concerns commerce, finance and industry. 
Of the twenty-one sections of this most important Article which 
wer~ not uniformly adopted, a number suffered at the hands of what 
may be called statutory tinkeren. It must be remembered that the 
Editor-in.Chief of the Code was the late Karl N. Llewellyn, who in 
addition to being probably the country's foremost authority on com-
mercial law, was one of the most accomplished and expert statutory 
draftsmen and critics our country has ever produced. Every line of 
the Code as promulgated had Karl's personal approval. Some of Karl's 
associates were equally adept and expert in statutory draftsmanship. 
For these reasons, to put it mildly, it takes a peculiar type of courage 
for an assistant in some legislative drafting agency (or even his chief) 
to presume that he has found a reason for changing the language of 
the Official Text and thus to destroy the complete uniformity of the 
Code.4 
'This criticism has no application to modifications due to local procedural 
differences. It does apply to legislative drafting agencies which refuse to depan 
from their peculiar local drafting policies. Unifonnity is impossible in a farflung 
field of law such as the regulation of commercial transactiona unless every state is 
willing to yield !Ollle Points (which ordinarily might be deemed important) in 
order to conform to the majority. 
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Now, let us look at the changes made by some states in Article 5. 
The very first section of Article 5, Section s•101, is entitled .. Short 
Title." It reads: 
'This Artiole shall be known, and may be cited as Uniform 
Commercial C.Ode---Commercial Paper." 
Ohio omitted this section entirely, and in Oregon the words "shall 
be known and" were omitted. 1 UCC, ULA 561. · 
It must be conceded that these omissions are minor, but they do 
indicate that the draftsmen who were responsible for them did not 
realize the importance of uniformity. Certainly, the inclusion in the 
Uniform Commercial Codes of both states of the section as written 
would have been completely harmless. . . 
Nothing can justify the result, namely, that sixteen pre•1963 Code 
states include in their Codes this section as drafted by the Code's ex· 
perts but that two states made these unnecessary and insignificant 
changes. . 
The next section in which unauthorized variations were made 1s 
section 5-101, entitled "Definitions and Index of Definitions." Her~ 
we find that changes were made in· the Codes of Arkansas, Connecu-
cut, Ohio and Oklahoma. 1 UCC, ULA 565. 
Subsection (t) of Section 5-101 begins, "Other definitions apply-
ing to this Article and the sections in which they appear are," and 
then follows a list of definitions, all contained in Article !l· 
Subsection (!l) of the same section states that-''The following 
definitions in other Articles apply to this Anicle" and then lists a 
number of definitions contained in Article 4. 
Arkansas and Oklahoma felt is necessary to include in subsection 
(t) "Documentary Draft" which is listed in subsection (!l) _as appearing 
in section 4-104- This was clearly unnecessary as subsection (5) states 
that •the definitions there listed "apply to this anicle." 
In Connecticut and Ohio there was a little careless proo&eading. 
Several references were to the wrong section. 
Now we come to a different type of amendment. but before dis-
cussing it, it is necessary to say a word about the Permanent Editorial 
Board for the Unifonn Commercial Code. 
When the practice of making non-uniform amen~nts. seemed _to 
be becoming general in state after state, it was detenruned. 1f financial 
support could be obtained, to create a Permanent Editorial Board 
for the Uniform Commercial Code, and to ask those in chugc of 
campaigns to have the Code enacted in non-Code states to witbold 
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
making unauthorized amendments until the proPosed amendments 
could be submitted to and passed uPon by the Board. 
The necessary financial support was obtained, an agreement was 
made by The American Law Institute and the National Conference 
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws for the creation and func-
tioning of the Board, and three sub-committees were appointed to 
study and examine any proposals made for the amendment of the 
Code, and also to examine the unauthorized amendments already 
made in Code states and ·to approve or disapprove them. 
The assignment of Subcommittee No. 1 is Articles 1, 2, 6 and 7 
of the Code; the assignment of Subcommittee No. 2 is Articles g, 4, 
5 and 8; and, to Subcommittee No. g is assigned Article 9. 
The Pennanent Editorial Board organized in May 1g62, its sub-
committees worked assiduously over the summer of 1962, and the Board 
had a three-day meeting in Philadelphia in the middle of October, 
after which it made its Rep0rt No. 1. In this Report a number of 
amendments were approved and promulgated, but a far greater 
number were disapproved. 
This brings us back to •the consideration of amendments to Article 
New York amends subsection (1)(c) of section 3-105 of the Code 
by adding certain words which would make a substantive difference 
in that subsection. 1 UCC, ULA 373. 
_ In its October 1962 Report, the Editorial Board approved this 
amendment. Thus, the only criticism of New York's action was that 
New York acted individually and without first consulting the Editorial 
Board which had drafted the Code. 
New York also amended sections g-107(2), 3-112(1 )(b)(c), 3-504, 
3·415, 3-504(4), 3-701 and 3-804. 
Two changes were made in subsection 3-107(2), both of which 
were rejected by the Editorial Board in irs Report. The Board gave 
its reasons for rejection at length. 1 UCC, ULA, 379, and RePort. page 
71. 
Section 3-112 is entitled "Terms and Omissions not Affecting 
Negotiability." 1 UCC, ULA 389. 
The New York changes, in subsections (1)(b) and (c), were not 
approved by the Permanent Editorial Board, but the Board recom-
mended that subsection (1)(b) be modified in a different way from 
that in which New York. had amended it. Report, page 20. 
Section 3-304-"Notice to Purchaser"-was amended by adding an 
entirely new clause (7) at the end of the section. 1 UCC, ULA 440. 
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The added clause practically reinstated section 56 of the N.I.L. 
in the Code, a section which had produced a tremendous amount of 
litigation and was intentionally abandoned by the Code's draftsmen. 
The Pennanent Editorial Board saw no reason for reversing a 
decision which had been deliberately made. RePort, page 74. 
New York added to Section 3-415-"Contract of Accommodation 
Party"-a new subsection (6). 1 UCC, ULA 497. 
The added clause would have restored the warranty obligations of 
an accommodation indorser formerly imposed by sections 65 and 66 
of ·the N.I.L. 
The policy decision set forth in the Official Text of the Code was 
carefully considered and the Permanent Editorial Board was not 
penuaded that it should reverse the previous decision. Report. page 
74-
Section J-504(4) was amended by inserting at the beginning a 
clause which docs not appear in the Official Text The clause refers 
to section 4-204- 1 UCC, ULA 516. 
The Editorial Board neither approved nor disapproved of this 
change. 
Section 5-701-"Letter of Advice oflnternational Sight Draft"-was 
amended by deleting entirely subsection (3). 1 UCC, ULA 558. 
This subsection is: 
"(3) Unless otherwise agreed and except where a draft is 
drawn under a credit issued by the drawee, the drawee of an 
international sight draft owes the drawer no duty to pay an 
unadvised draft but if it does so and the draft is genuine, may 
appropriately debit the drawer's account." 
The Permanent Editorial Board rejected this deletion stating that 
"insufficient grounds have_ been advanced to delete the subsection." 
R.eport, page 76. 
Section 3-804-"Lost, Destroyed or Stolen Instruments"-was amend-
ed by changing the word "may" to "shall" in the sentence, "The court 
may require security indemnifying the defendant against Joss by rea-
son of further claims on the instrument." 1 UCC, ULA 565. 
The Permanent Editorial Board rejected this change on the 
ground that courts should have discretion whether or not to require 
security. Report, page 77. 
Connecticut in 1961 amended section 3-1o6 of its Code. 1 UCC, 
ULA 377. That section is entitled "Sum Cenain." _ 
Section 3-106 begins, "(1) The sum payable is a sum certain even 
though it is to be paid" and then follow five situations which do not 
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prevent the sum payable from being a sum certain. To these situations 
Connecticut added a sixth clause reading as follows: 
"(£) with provisions for payment by the maker of taxes levied 
or a~scssecl upon the instmmcnt or the indebtedness evidenced 
thereby." 
This amendment apparently escaped the attention of the Per-
manent Editorial Board as its Report neither approves nor disapproves 
it. 
Oklahoma amended section 5-110, entitled "Payable to Order." by 
inserting the word ''there" in subsection (1)(g) so as to make the last 
part of the subesction read-"and may be indorsed or transferred by 
any person there thereto 1,11thorized." We cannot believe that this was 
an intentional amendment. See I UCC. ULA 586. 
Arkansas amended sections 5-118(a) and 5-501(2)(b). Section 5-118 
is entitled "Ambiguous Terms and Rules of Construction." Subsec-
tion (a) as drafted by the sponsors of the Code reads ( 1 UCC, ULA 
401): 
"Where there is doubt whether the instrument is a draft or 
a note the holder may treat it as either .... " 
The draftsman apparently thought that he would improve this Ian, 
~age by adding the word "drawn" after the word "draft"! · 
Section 5-501 is entitled "When Presentment. Notice of Dishonor, 
and Protest Necessary or Permissible." 1 UCC, ULA 515. 
Arkansas amended subsection (1)(b) so as to make it identical with 
subsection (1)(b). This was obviously an error. 
For this reason. it was rejected by the Permanent Editorial Board. 
Report, page 75. 
Connecticut. Illinois. Massachusetts, New York and Rhode Island 
amended section 5-u1 in substantially the same manner, and the Per-
manent Editorial Board approved the change in its October 1g61 
ReporL Report. page u. See 1 UCC, ULA 4og-410. 
Wyoming rewrote subsection (5) of section 5-101, entitled "Nego-
tiation" and omitted subsection (4) entirely. 1 UCC, ULA 415. 
The rewriting of subsection (5) was disappro'VCd by the Permanent 
Editorial Board (Report, page 75) as was the deletion of subsection 
(4) which reads: 
"(4) Words of assigninent. condition. waiver, guaranty, lim-
itation or disclaimer of liability and the like accompanying an 
indorsement do not affect its character as an indorsemenL" 
The Permanent Editorial Board pointed out that this subsection 
resolved a conflict in decisions under the N .I.L and that for this pur-
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pose it was very useful. Accordingly, it rejected the Wyoming amend-
menL Report, page 75. 
Arkansas and Oregon made changes in subsection (4) of section 
5-1o6 entitled "Effect of Restrictive lndorsement:• 1 UCC. ULA 412. 
The Arkansas deviation is merely an inaccuracy, referring to sec-
tion 5-105 instead of to section 5-501. 
The Oregon change would omit a reference to another section in 
parentheses. These cross references appear throughout the Code for 
the purpose of making clear the intention of particular provisions. No 
good reason can be imagined for having deleted this reference. 
Rhode Island departs from the Official Text in section s-1<>7 en-
titled "Negotiation Effective Although It May Be R.escinded." 1 UCC, 
ULA 425. 
The last sentence of this section is as follows: 
.. (1) Exceet as against a subsequent holder in due course 
such negotiauon is in an appropriate case subject to rescission. 
the declaration of a constructive trust or any other remedy 
permitted by law." 
Rhode Island deleted the word "other" before "remedy." 
This change was rejected by the Permanent Editorial Board as 
being merely a matter of style, without any legal significance. R.eport. 
P•74-
New Mexico amended section 5-405(1)(b} entitled "Signature by 
Authorized R.epresentative." 1 UCC, ULA 465. 
The amendment consists of inserting the word "not" in such a 
way as to make the last clause of the subsection meaningless. 
Georgia amended section 5-405 entitled "lmposton; Signature in 
Name of Payee" by substituting the word .. Imposter" for .. Impostor." 
1 UCC, ULA 471. Th.is no doubt was accidental but there is a differ-
ence in the meaning of the words. 
New Mexico and New York amended section 5-411, entitled "/u;-
ceptance Varying DrafL" I ucc. ULA 491. 
Subsection (1) reads: 
''The terms of the draft are not varied by an acceetance to 
pay at any particular bank or place in the continental United 
States, unless the acceptance states that the draft is to be paid 
only at such bank or place." 
New Mexico substituted the word .. and" for "er' u the next to the 
last word. New York omitted the word "continental." 
The Editorial Board approved the omission of the word "con-
tinental" and ignored the New Mexico variation. Report, page 15. 
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Ohio felt it necessary to modify section 3-419 relating to "Con-
version of Instrument; Innocent Representative." 1 UCC, ULA 512. 
The Official Text refers to "provisions of this act concerning re-
strictive endorsements." The Ohio draftsman was not satisfied with 
this but made specific reference by number to four sections of the 
Code. 
Both Kentucky and Oklahoma amended subsection (1)(d) of sec-
tion 3-6o1 by substituting the word "security" for "collateral." 1 UCC, 
UI.A 545· 
The Permanent Editorial Board rejected this substitution stating 
that the word should. be "collateral." Report, page 76. 
Oklahoma amended subsection (1)(b) of section 3-801 by inserting 
into the subsection an additional sentence. 1 UCC, ULA 562. 
The Editorial Board rejected the amendment on the ground that 
"the additional language is already well recognized as a matter of case 
law." Repart, page 76. 
Of the eighteen pre-1963 Code states, five enacted the 79 sections of 
Article 3 without any variations from the Official Text. These states 
were Alaska, Michigan, New Hampshire, New Jersey and Pennsylvania. 
Five states amended one section of the Official Text. These states· 
were Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Massachusetts and Wyoming. 
Two states, New Mexico and Rhode Island, changed two sections; 
two states, Connecticut and Ohio, changed three sections, and three 
states, Arkansas, Oklahoma and Oregon, changed four sections. 
New York felt it necessary to amend nine sections. However, it 
must be said for New York that a bill enacted by the 1g63 legislature 
has made the New York Code adhere much more nearly to the 1962 
Official Text:i than the New York Act of 1962 conformed to the 1958 
Official Text. 
Although twenty-five sections of Article 3 were modified, nineteen 
of these sections were changed by only one state. The largest number 
of states to make the same am.endment was five.• 
Fifty-four sections (unamended in any of the eighteen states) con-
stitute a little more than sixty-eight per cent of the sections in Article 
3. I,t is true that of the amendments made to the twenty-five modified 
rrhe 1g62 Ollidal Text is the 1958 Official Text with the amendments promul-
gated by the Permanent Editorial Board in October, 1g62. 
'We have not included as a change the amendment of§ 3-511. There was a 
typographical error in printing the 1958 Official Tex:t with C.Omments. This error 
resulted in the substitution of the word "of" for "or". The ,even states which did 
not catch the error until after their Clodes had been enaaed were Arkansas, c.on-
necticut, Georgia, lllinols, Mamchmetu, Oregon and Wyoming. 
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sections, some were trivial, some were careless, and some were the re-
sult of a misunderstanding of the history and purpose of the section 
as promulgated by the Institute and the Conference. 
The amendments which were trivial may be said to have done 
no harm but it can be said with equal force that being trivial, they 
should not have been made. The amendments which were due to 
carelessness illustrate the importance of having an act of the magnitude 
of the Code thoroughly proof-read.The amendments made because 
of a misunderstanding of the history and purpose of the amended pro-
visions ought not to have been made without consulting the original 
Editorial Board which had supervised the drafting of the Code and 
which, although not active, was nevertheless available for consultation 
at all times., 
It is too early to give in detail the results of 1965 enactments either 
of the Code or of amendments to the Code. 
We do know that five states which thus far have enacted the Code 
this year are said to have adopted the 1961 Official Text And we do 
know that in a few, but not nearly the entire eighteen, of the states 
which enacted the Code prior to 1sG5, bills have either been enacted 
or are pending to bring the Code up to date by incorporating the 
officially promulgated 1g61 amendments. As this is being written, leg-
islatures are still in session so that it would be futile to try to assess 
the result of this year's legislation. 
Now, finally, we come to the question, Why is uniformity impor-
tant in our statutory law regulating commerciel transactions? 
The answer seems so obvious that it is almost difficult to formulate 
it. 
Today, in the United States, the number of important concerns 
which transact business in every state is growing every year and the 
number which transact business in only one state is becoming less and 
less percentagewise. Writing as long ago as April 1958 in The Busineu 
Lawyer, Walter D. Malcolm, Esquire, of Boston, stated that: 
"[T]he number of 'items' handled by banks as part of the 
bank collection process has, since 1goo, grown to tremendous 
proportions. It has been estimated that throughout the entire 
country banks handle not less than 25,000,000 items every busi-
ness day. As a matter of fact a rough test, made after that 
25,000,000 estimate was made, indicates that the figure is nearer 
50,000,000 items per day rather than twenty-five. 
'The Clairman of the Board was the la1e Judge Herbert F. Goodrich of Phila-
ddphia from the inception of the Code project until the Editorial Board wa~ suc-
ceeded by the Pennanent Editorial Board. Judge Goodrich was the fint Chamoan 
of the latter Board and the writer is now seniog in that capacity. 
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
"This tremendous volume moving with surprising speed 
and efficiency from one bank to another within single cities and 
towns and between cities and towns over state boundary lines 
has created a set of problems which are in no way satisfactor-
ily handled by the commercial acts of 1 900." 
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Should the sales department of a great manufacturer whose pro-
ducts go into every state be obliged to familiarize itself with the indi-
vidual Codes of all the states which have enacted the "Uniform" 
Commercial Code for fear that the supposedly uniform provisions of 
the law of sales have been tampered with by local draftsmen? Should 
the officers of a bank in a great metropolitan center which has cor-
respondents a,ll over the United States be obliged to exercise care in 
dealing with banks in other states which have enacted the Uniform 
Commercial Code lest they overlook some non-uniform amendment 
which has been made in a particular state? Does not state individual-
ism in the enactment of the Code destroy much of the value which the 
Code would otherwise have? And finally, in how many instances are 
non-uniform amendments made by individual states without consulta-
tion with the Code's Editorial Board, of major importance? 
To -the first two questions the obvious answer is "no"; to the third 
question the obvious answer is .. yes"; and to the final question an ex-
amination of the typical article as nonuniformally amended in eight-
een states will inevitably lead to the conclusion that none of the dif-
fering amendments was really important. 
In this last connection, it may not be out of place to mention the 
fact that Pennsylvania, which is by no means the least important of 
the fifty states in commercial transactions, has had the Code in force 
almost ten yean and has not found it necessary to make a single un-
official amendment. 
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws intends to pursue real uniformity in the statutory regulation 
of commercial transactions unless and until the task becomes hopeless. 
States which have the Code on their statute books with a few or many 
non-uniform amendments will he urged to eliminate those amend-
ments. And the effort to have our entire fifty states enact the Code as 
drafted with the amendments officially promulgated by the Perman-
ent Editorial Board will continue. 
We believe that within a very few years every state will have on 
ita statute books a: Commercial c.ode which will be approximately 75 
per cent uniform. However, that will not satisfy those of us who a, 
lawyers see the necessity for uniformity in this area and I fear that it 
will not permanently satisfy American business. 
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